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Reconsidering the Separation of
Banking and Commerce
Mehrsa Baradaran*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the long-held belief that banking and commerce
need to be kept separate to ensure a stable banking system.  Specifically, the
Article criticizes the Bank Holding Company Act (“BHCA”), which prohibits
nonbanking entities from owning banks.  The recent banking collapse has
caused and exacerbated several problematic trends in U.S. banking, especially
the conglomeration of banking entities and the homogenization of assets.  The
inflexible and outdated provisions of the BHCA are a major cause of these
trends.  Since the enactment of the BHCA, the landscape of U.S. banking has
changed dramatically, but the strict separation of banking and commerce em-
bodied in the BHCA does not reflect these changes.  This Article argues that
allowing commercial firms to own banks could lead to a more diversified and
less risk-prone financial structure, and gives examples of possible changes and
potential ownership structures that could reduce risks in the financial system.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386
I. SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
A. Different Meanings of “Separation of Banking and
Commerce” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
1. The Separation of Banking and Commerce
in Banking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
2. The Separation of Banking and Commerce
in Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394
B. The BHCA Does Not Fit the Current
Banking Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
* Associate Professor, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.  I would
like to thank the following people for their valuable comments on this Article: Geoffrey Miller,
Erik Gerding, Christian Johnson, Renee Jones, Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Julie Hill, Troy Mc-
Kenzie, Darryle Rude, George Sutton, Christopher Robertson, Lisa Grow Sun, RonNell Ander-
sen Jones, Brigham Daniels, Shima Baradaran, and Jared Ruiz Bybee.  I would also like to thank
workshop participants and commenters at the following law schools where this Article was
presented: New York University School of Law; The George Washington University Law
School; Boston College School of Law; Notre Dame School of Law; University of Denver School
of Law; University of Georgia School of Law; University of Utah College of Law; American
University, Washington College of Law; Temple University School of Law; University of Kansas
School of Law; Rutgers School of Law; and St. Louis School of Law.  I would also like to thank
my research assistants Brad Lowe, James Dunkelberger, and Evan Pack.
February 2012 Vol. 80 No. 2
385
386 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:385
II. THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT AND THE
BANKING CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
A. Banks Are Too Large . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
1. “Too Big to Fail” Bailouts and Dodd-Frank . . . . 407
2. Commercial Firm Ownership Versus Large
Banking Conglomerates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
B. Homogenization and Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
1. The Current Banking System Leaves Individual
Banks Ill Equipped to Deal with Contagion . . . . 410
2. Commercial Firms as a Source of Strength . . . . . 414
C. The Current Banking Model Creates Incentives
for Risktaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
1. Problems with Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
2. Commercial Firms and “Skin in the Game” . . . . 421
III. MIXING BANKING AND COMMERCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422
A. Industrial Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
B. Arguments Against Mixing Banking
and Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
1. Should the Exception Become the Rule? . . . . . . . 435
2. Can Regulators Monitor
Nonbanking Businesses? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436
3. Excessive Power? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438
APPENDIX: BANK HEALTH INDICATORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439
INTRODUCTION
In 2005, during the heyday of banking, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., pe-
titioned the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to
open a bank.1  The controversy that followed was monumental—ex-
perts and the public were outraged and voiced their fears about a po-
tential Wal-Mart national bank.2  Many feared that a Wal-Mart bank
would threaten bank safety and pose an unacceptable threat to com-
munity banks across the country that would ultimately result in their
failure.3
Although it is likely that a Wal-Mart bank would have posed a
formidable challenge to small banks across the country, it is also prob-
able that if Wal-Mart had opened a bank in 2005, its bank today would
1 Application for Deposit Insurance for Wal-Mart Bank, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,531, 10,532
(Mar. 1, 2006) (public hearing notice).
2 Eric Dash, Wal-Mart Abandons Bank Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at C1.
3 Id.
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be one of the safest in the country.  In contrast to small and large
traditional banks that failed by the hundreds, a bank backed by the
retail behemoth would most likely have thrived.  A Wal-Mart bank
would have a natural financial incentive to limit risk.  If the bank had
failed like so many banks across the country, Wal-Mart would have
had to pay out its obligations.4  The specter of real loss diminishes
incentives for risktaking even without regulation.  By contrast, the
current banking structure perversely incentivizes banks to increase
leverage and risk exposure.  When risktaking causes banks to default
or fail, the federal government subsidizes losses explicitly through de-
posit insurance, and implicitly through bailouts.5  These are important
seeds of the banking crisis: banks make increased profits when they
take increased risks but do not bear the full burden of the downside of
that risk.
Since the crisis, banking regulators have been patching up holes
in the regulatory dam that stands tenuously to prevent the flow of
money from regulated banks into high-risk ventures promising signifi-
cant returns on investments.  What they have not done is examine the
dam itself and ask whether the way banks are structured and owned
has created hazardous incentives.  In other words, in attempting to
remedy the problem with measures such as the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,6  regulators have fo-
cused their efforts on making and amending lists of what banks can
and cannot do without paying attention to the underlying structures
that motivate banks to skirt the rules.
When banks are incentivized to take risks, even the most targeted
and comprehensive regulation comes up short.  Regulating the bank-
ing industry is enormously complex.  It is too easy for regulators to be
lulled into complacency by a smooth economy and too difficult to see
the dangers lurking beneath the surface of enormous banking organi-
zations.7  Indeed, some have argued that regulators had the power to
prevent the most recent banking crisis, but that they did not do so
4 See infra Part II.C.2.
5 Collectively these are referred to as the “banking safety net.” See ANDREW G
HALDANE & PIERGIORGIO ALESSANDRI, BANKING ON THE STATE 2–4 (2009), available at http://
www.bis.org/review/r091111e.pdf (describing the historical evolution of the banking safety net).
6 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
7 See Gretchen Morgenson, A Bank Crisis Whodunit, With Laughs and Tears, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2011 (SundayBusiness), at 1 (discussing the recent report issued by the Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission and noting that the Federal Reserve, despite the financial crisis all
around it, remained “defiantly inert and uninterested in reining in the mortgage mania” and
continued its cozy relationships with large financial institutions).
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because they did not recognize the problem as such.8  Unfortunately,
given the complexity of the current system, it seems unlikely that
Dodd-Frank will miraculously fix this regulatory blindness.
Thus, the solution to the problem does not lie in tweaking the
details of the labyrinthine regulatory scheme, but in examining the
roots of the underlying problems in banking.  This Article examines
and challenges one of the guiding principles of banking regulation: the
separation of banking and commerce, as enforced through the Bank
Holding Company Act (“BHCA”).9  For decades, banking law has
been guided by an unchallenged principle that banking and commerce
should not mix.10  The principle’s torchbearers have claimed that its
enforcement is necessary to ensure the safety of the banking system,11
when in fact it has led to a banking system more prone to collapse.
This Article suggests that the walls erected in the name of safety have
intensified the crisis noted above.
The concept of separating banking from commerce has also been
muddled in the policy and academic discourse in the past several de-
cades.  Scholars and policymakers have erroneously considered the
separation of banking and commerce to be a single concept, when in
fact it is two very different subconcepts.  This Article attempts to dis-
pel that confusion by distinguishing what is referred to as the separa-
tion of banking and commerce in banking, which addresses what a
bank can do, from the separation of banking and commerce in com-
merce, which addresses who can own a bank.  This distinction leads to
a clearer discussion of what is at stake in bank regulation.
Part I of this Article defines separation of banking and com-
merce, and describes and differentiates the various meanings inherent
in the term; it also briefly discusses the history associated with the
different variations of the principle.  Part II describes how separating
banking and commerce through the BHCA has caused and exacer-
8 See, e.g., Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government Sponsored Enterprises:
Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n 10 (2010) (written statement of Alan Greenspan,
former Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2010-04-07%20Alan%20Greenspan%20Written%2
0Testimony.pdf (“I believe that during the past 18 months, there were very few instances of
serial default and contagion that could not have been contained by adequate risk-based capital
and liquidity.”).
9 Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1843 (2006).
10 Bernard Shull, The Separation of Banking and Commerce in the United States: An Ex-
amination of Principal Issues, FIN. MARKETS INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Aug. 1999, at 1, 1.
For an in-depth discussion of the history of the separation of banking and commerce in the
United States, including policy issues and cost-benefit analyses, see id. at 7–14, 20–44.
11 Id. at 21.
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bated the precarious structure of modern banking.  Finally, Part III
outlines possible alternatives to the strict separation of banking and
commerce, such as commercial ownership of traditional banks, and
analyzes potential benefits and problems in such arrangements.  Spe-
cifically, this Article demonstrates the advantages of commercial own-
ership of banks by analyzing data from industrial banks, which are the
only bank charters exempt from the BHCA’s restrictions on commer-
cial ownership.
I. SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE
The concept of separation of banking and commerce has been
discussed for almost a century, but has taken on different meanings
during that time.12 Without a coherent definition of what this separa-
tion is meant to achieve, policymakers have used the broad umbrella
of “separation of banking and commerce” to justify various contrast-
ing measures.  If there has been any consensus on this overbroad
phrase, it has been that the mixing of banking and commerce is risky.13
Indeed, even without convincing evidence of its ill effects, the idea
that banking and commerce must be kept separate has resurfaced dur-
ing attempts at banking reform in the immediate aftermath of various
financial crises.14  It is often argued that banks are particularly vulner-
able entities that need heightened restrictions and regulations to pro-
tect them,15 and that any mingling with commercial firms or
12 See Christine E. Blair, The Mixing of Banking and Commerce: Current Policy Issues, 16
FDIC BANKING REV., no. 4, 2004 at 97, 99, available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/
banking/2005jan/article3.pdf (“The literature on the issue of a long-standing principle of separat-
ing banking and commerce is extensive.”).
13 PAULINE B. HELLER & MELANIE L. FEIN, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW
§ 17.01[6], at 17-8 (rev. ed., release 27, 2011) (discussing congressional testimony in the 1940s
and 1950s, in which several Federal Reserve chairmen warned of the risks associated with mixing
banking and commerce).
14 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1564 (2007) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Wal-Mart] (noting that Congress
pointed to banks’ speculative securities and real estate operations as important causes of the
collapse of the banking system in the early 1930s to justify more stringent separation legislation);
id. at 1573–79 (“Congress responded to the thrift debacle by enacting the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). . . .  [S]everal provisions of FIR-
REA strictly limited the authority of thrift institutions to engage in commercial lines of busi-
nesses or to be associated with commercial firms.”); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark
Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial
Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 970–72 (2009) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal
Banking] (arguing that large financial conglomerates offering a variety of nontraditional fee-
based services helped precipitate the recent financial crisis).
15 Bank Holding Bill: Hearings on S. 2318 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 81st Cong. 216 (1950) (statement of Thomas McCabe, Chairman, Board of Gover-
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commercial activities would corrupt them.16  This assertion has not yet
been convincingly studied.
A. Different Meanings of “Separation of Banking and Commerce”
Although there are a number of possible ways that banking and
commerce can mix, the most common are (1) banks engaging in non-
banking activity, and (2) commercial firms owning banks.17  This Arti-
cle differentiates these two concepts as “the separation of banking and
commerce in banking,” which deals with banks engaging in commer-
cial activities, and “the separation of banking and commerce in com-
merce,” which addresses commercial ownership of banks.
Most commentators and industry experts refer to the separation
of banking and commerce without making any distinction between the
different variations of this concept.18  However, the forms are quite
distinct and incomparable.  This oversight has led to a muddled dis-
course on the topic with abuses associated with banks engaging in
nonbanking activity being cited as justifications to prohibit commer-
cial ownership of banks.19
Even those scholars who have written about the separation of
banking and commerce have neglected to clearly distinguish the two
forms of separation.20  When Professor Edward Symons wrote about
the need for separating banking and commerce, he used historical
nors of the Federal Reserve System) (“[O]f this fundamental truth I have become convinced:
That the business of banking is a sacred public trust.”). See generally E. Gerald Corrigan, Are
Banks Special?, 1982 FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS ANN. REP. 2, available at http://
www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1982a.cfm (discussing the factors that distinguish financial in-
stitutions from all other institutions and how those differences should shape the way banks are
regulated).
16 The abuses cited are, among others, conflicts of interest, concentration of power, and
systemic risk concerns.  Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 14, at 1568–69 (citing S. REP. NO. 91-
1084, at 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5519, 5522; H.R. REP. NO. 91-1747, at 1–2
(1970) (Conf. Rep.)).
17 See Joseph G. Haubrich & Joa˜o A. C. Santos, Alternative Forms of Mixing Banking with
Commerce: Evidence from American History, 12 FIN. MARKETS INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS
121, 122–23 (2003) (showing that there are at least five different examples of how banking and
commerce can be combined: “(1) a bank owns a firm; (2) a bank controls a firm; (3) a firm owns
(or controls) a bank; (4) a person controls both a bank and a firm; and (5) a holding company
controls both a bank and a firm”).
18 See, e.g., John Krainer, The Separation of Banking and Commerce, 2000 FRBSF ECON.
REV. 15, available at http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/econrev/2000/article2.pdf (discussing the
costs and benefits of a union between banks and commercial firms, without defining exactly what
that union would entail).
19 See infra Part I.A.2.
20 See, e.g., Stephen K. Halpert, The Separation of Banking and Commerce Reconsidered,
13 J. CORP. L. 481 (1988).  Professor Halpert advocates for a mixing of banking and commerce,
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data that related to banks engaging in commercial activities to justify a
sweeping reproach of the mixing of banking and commerce, but never
addressed any dangers associated with commercial ownership of
banks.21  In addition, when Professor Arthur Wilmarth argued that
commercial firms should not be allowed to own banks, he relied in
part on “several occasions” when “failures of depository institutions
involved with commercial activities triggered serious financial cri-
ses.”22  The difference in the two types of separation, however, is cru-
cial.  They involve different risk incentives and structures, and any
discussion of separating banking and commerce must distinguish be-
tween these two meanings.
The mixing of banking and commerce in banking, discussed be-
low, has received much attention in the last several years and has been
cited as one of the causes of the recent financial crisis.23  The separa-
tion was imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act24 in 1933, undone by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act25 in 1999, and reapplied by the Dodd-Frank
Act through the Volcker Rule.26  Most of the academic and regulatory
and although his history takes into account the BHCA, his examples and analysis do not deal
with commercial bank ownership, but rather activities conducted within a bank. Id.
21 See generally Edward L. Symons, Jr., The “Business of Banking” in Historical Perspec-
tive, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 723–26 (1983).
22 Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 14, at 1554.
23 See, e.g., Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 14, at 972.
24 Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
25 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 101, 103, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341–1351
(1999) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 1843 (2006)).
26 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–31 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).  After
the stock market crash of 1929 and the banking crisis that ensued, contemporary observers be-
lieved, much like current commentators, that the mixing of banking and commerce contributed
to the crash and the Great Depression. See Randall S. Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajan, Is the
Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking Before 1933,
84 AM. ECON. REV. 810 (1994).  In response, Congress passed Glass-Steagall, which prohibited,
inter alia, “commercial banks from underwriting, holding, or dealing in corporate securities, ei-
ther directly or through security affiliates.” Id. at 810 (citing the Glass-Steagall Act).  This
mandatory separation continued until the 1980s when the Federal Reserve Board permitted
banks to own subsidiaries that engaged in securities dealing and underwriting.  Adam
Feibelman, Commercial Lending and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 75 U. CIN. L.
REV. 943, 960 (2007).  Subsequently, as a result of lobbying and the trend established by the
Federal Reserve, Congress passed Gramm-Leach-Bliley, which limited Glass-Steagall and pro-
vided, inter alia, that entities qualifying as “financial holding companies” can engage in under-
writing, holding, or dealing with corporate securities. Id.  However, following the financial crisis
of 2007 and 2008, Congress passed Dodd-Frank, which created a regulatory framework that ef-
fectively dismantled Gramm-Leach-Bliley and reinstituted many of the same principles of Glass-
Steagall. See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK
ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 4–6 (2011).  Specifically, Dodd-Frank, through the
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debate for the last several decades has focused on this separation.
Regulating the separation of banking and commerce in banking, how-
ever, merely tinkers with the regulatory regime without changing the
incentive structure of the banking system, and thus does not address
the problematic incentive structures within banks.
Accordingly, although this Article briefly details the inception of
these two separations of banking and commerce, it focuses on the sep-
aration of banking and commerce in commerce—specifically, bank
ownership by commercial firms.  The restrictions on bank ownership
are especially relevant today due to the drastic changes in banking
caused by the recent crisis.
1. The Separation of Banking and Commerce in Banking
It seems settled from historical experimentation that when banks
engage in commercial activities, there is instability and loss.  In his
seminal article, The “Business of Banking” in Historical Perspective,
Symons argued that since the early Republic, banking regulators or
their historical equivalents have attempted to stop banks from engag-
ing in nonbanking businesses because they saw banks losing their de-
positors’ money when the banks would engage in commercial
activity.27  Policymakers wanted banks to be a safe place for deposits
and asserted that banks engaging in commerce compromised public
trust in the institution.  Therefore, predating the New Deal and the
regulatory fervor that opened the doors for Glass-Steagall, the Na-
tional Bank Act and various other regulatory measures were designed
to separate banking and commerce in banking.28
The term “separation of banking and commerce” was first used to
justify Glass-Steagall, which initiated a prohibition on banks engaging
in “nonbanking” activities, such as securities or insurance underwrit-
ing.29  Before the stock market crash of 1929, banks had grown in size,
moving away from the small, localized system of early American
banking.30  Glass-Steagall was a response to the general public senti-
ment that the Great Depression was caused by alliances between
Volcker Rule, see infra notes 36–41, restricts banks’ proprietary security activities and sponsor-
ship of private-equity firms, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 619, 124 Stat. at 1620–31; SKEEL, supra, at 85–91.
27 Symons, supra note 21, at 685.
28 See generally id. (discussing the phrase “the business of banking” and the ways in which
the term has been defined to restrict bank powers since it was first used in the 1863 predecessor
to the National Bank Act).
29 Krainer, supra note 18, at 16–17.
30 Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act: Has It Lived Its Life?, 38 VILL. L.
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bankers and industrialists, which led to unfair and risky practices that
brought down banks, commercial firms, and the U.S. economy.31  This
analysis was not complete, but it was accepted by the public as an
explanation for the Great Depression.32
Glass-Steagall focused on the activities that could be conducted
within a bank and was the first legislative attempt to explicitly sepa-
rate commerce-like activities from traditional banking activities inside
a banking structure.33  Specifically, Glass-Steagall restricted banks
from engaging in investment banking and commercial banking activi-
ties and set restrictions on banks underwriting securities or insurance
and engaging in other types of brokerage services.34  These restrictions
remained in effect until 1999 when Gramm-Leach-Bliley repealed
many of the important restrictions and firewalls imposed by Glass-
Steagall.35  Specifically, Gramm-Leach-Bliley repealed the provisions
of Glass-Steagall that forbade banks from engaging in securities and
insurance underwriting with the purpose of making banks more com-
petitive in response to appeals by the banking industry for
deregulation.36
Recently, the Volcker Rule, which became part of the financial
reform package passed by Congress in July 2010, reinstated these
same restrictions.37  It was widely believed that proprietary trading
REV. 1, 6–10 (1993) (discussing the evolution of bank size from the time of the American
Revolution through the early 1900s).
31 WILLIAM D. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB 87061, GLASS-STEAGALL ACT:
COMMERCIAL VS. INVESTMENT BANKING 2 (1987) (“In the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, bankers and brokers were sometimes indistinguishable.  Then, in the Great Depression af-
ter 1929, Congress examined the mixing of the ‘commercial’ and ‘investment’ banking industries
that occurred in the 1920s.  Hearings revealed conflicts of interest and fraud in some banking
institutions’ securities activities.  A formidable barrier to the mixing of these activities was then
set up by the Glass-Steagall Act.”); Felsenfeld, supra note 30, at 63 (“The Act was a congres-
sional reaction to the Great Depression and the high-flying securities speculations engaged in by
some banks and their affiliates during the 1920s that Congress considered partly responsible for
the economic crisis.”).
32 Some have rejected the idea that the Great Depression was caused by relationships
between bankers and industrialists. See, e.g., OFFICE OF RESEARCH & STRATEGIC PLANNING,
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANDATE FOR CHANGE: RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING INDUSTRY
37–38, 42 (1987).
33 See Blair, supra note 12, at 100.
34 Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 14, at 1564–65.
35 Many commentators believe that the deregulation of banking caused by Gramm-Leach-
Bliley is one of the main causes of the current financial crisis.  For a discussion of this argument,
see Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 14, at 973, 987, 1049–50.
36 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, §§ 101, 103, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341–51
(1999) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 1843 (2006)).
37 See generally John Cassidy, The Volcker Rule: Obama’s Economic Advisor and His Bat-
tles over the Financial-Reform Bill, NEW YORKER, July 26, 2010, at 25.
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within banks had led to banks engaging in riskier behavior, and that,
by prohibiting proprietary trading, regulators could cause banks to fo-
cus on less risk-prone practices.38  Paul Volcker, a former chairman of
the Federal Reserve, argued that commercial banks, which are sup-
ported by the FDIC insurance fund, should focus on less risky, tradi-
tional banking practices, such as lending and deposit taking.39
Investment banks, on the other hand, which are not supported by the
FDIC, can focus on proprietary trading, or speculating in the markets
for their own gains.40  The rule thus relieves the taxpayer from provid-
ing a backstop for these risky activities.
The regulation of the activities banks may conduct will likely de-
crease some opportunities for risktaking in the financial sector, but it
will not address the incentives guiding banks to engage in those risks.
By Paul Volcker’s own admission, it is unlikely that this rule (as
adopted in the final version of Dodd-Frank) will cause banks to incur
less risk.41  Banks may be forced to change their practices, but if they
want to engage in risky activities, they can.  It is difficult to regulate
away risktaking behavior, because the regulated entity that stands to
gain a large profit will likely be able to find a loophole to skirt the
defined limits.  What is needed instead are changes to the fundamen-
tal structure of banks that will discourage excessive risktaking activity.
One such possible change—allowing commercial entities to own
banks—has historically been forbidden based on the same rationale
used to justify the separation of banking and commerce in banking as
discussed above.
2. The Separation of Banking and Commerce in Commerce
In 1956, the BHCA initiated the prohibition on commercial firms
owning banks, or the separation of banking and commerce in com-
merce.42  Notably, the BHCA was a reaction to a perceived threat that
had not yet materialized.43  The threat was conglomeration in banking,
and the perpetrator was Transamerica, a large corporation that con-
trolled interests in a variety of different industries, including a few
38 Id. at 25–26.
39 Id. at 25.
40 Id.
41 See id. at 26.
42 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1843 (2006); Blair, supra note
12, at 100.
43 See OFFICE OF RESEARCH & STRATEGIC PLANNING, supra note 32, at 31; see also Blair,
supra note 12, at 100.
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banking subsidiaries.44  The BHCA was enacted to stop the feared ex-
pansion of Transamerica into a national banking conglomerate.45  The
Federal Reserve Board feared Transamerica’s “commingling of bank-
ing and commerce” because it controlled the largest bank in the
world, Bank of America, in addition to forty-six other banks and nu-
merous nonbank interests.46  After a failed attempt to combat the ex-
pansion with antitrust laws,47 Congress passed the BHCA.48
The BHCA and its amendments were created mainly as prevent-
ative measures, backed by speculation that banks might be jeopard-
ized by commercial firms or that bank ownership would become
monopolistic.49  The BHCA was not created to react to a history of
abuse, and no abuse was cited to justify its enactment.50  In the con-
gressional hearings, there was no testimony that the bank holding
company legislation “was for the purpose of correcting any present or
existing difficulties.”51  The Senate hearings further reveal that the
BHCA was preventative rather than responsive; no existing problems
were enumerated.52  The fears that the BHCA addressed could have
44 OFFICE OF RESEARCH & STRATEGIC PLANNING, supra note 32, at 31; Felsenfeld, supra
note 30, at 64.
45 OFFICE OF RESEARCH & STRATEGIC PLANNING, supra note 32, at 31; Felsenfeld, supra
note 30, at 64.
46 HELLER & FEIN, supra note 13, § 17.01[7], at 17-14; OFFICE OF RESEARCH & STRATE-
GIC PLANNING, supra note 32, at 31; Felsenfeld, supra note 30, at 64.
47 In 1948, the Federal Reserve brought an action against Transamerica, alleging that it
violated section 7 of the Clayton Act by “continuously and systematically” buying up stock of
independent commercial banks in five western states: Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon, and
Washington. HELLER & FEIN, supra note 13, § 17.01[7], at 17-14.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act
“prohibits a corporation from acquiring the stock of one or more corporations where the effect
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.” Id.; see also Clayton
Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).  The Federal Reserve ordered Transamerica to divest its subsidi-
ary banks and sell its stock of Bank of America, but the order was overturned by the court of
appeals. See Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953); see also
HELLER & FEIN, supra note 13, § 17.01[7], at 17-14.  This failure to disband the perceived threat
to American banking led to enactment of the BHCA by Congress. HELLER & FEIN, supra note
13, § 17.01[7], at 17-14.
48 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1850 (2006)).
49 See Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73
VA. L. REV. 301, 302–05 (1987).
50 See Thomas E. Wilson, Separation Between Banking and Commerce Under the Bank
Holding Company Act—a Statutory Objective Under Attack, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 163, 166
(1983) (noting that legislators and regulators considered creating a new regulatory scheme based
merely on the fear of the possibility of commingling banking and commerce in a single corporate
entity).
51 101 CONG. REC. 7957 (1955) (statement of Rep. Harris Ellsworth).
52 Halpert, supra note 20, at 496–98 (explaining that the position of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve, which favored restricting bank holding companies from engaging in
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been alleviated by adequate supervision instead of a complete ban on
commercial ownership of banks.
Nevertheless, the BHCA was the first regulatory action that at-
tempted to separate banking from commerce at the ownership level.
The BHCA, as enacted in 1956, regulated companies that owned two
or more banks and was designed to keep bank ownership decentral-
ized.53  The BHCA’s primary purpose was to avoid the aggregation of
banking resources in one organization and to prevent the undue con-
centration of power that might result when banking and nonbanking
units were organized under one corporate firm.54
Even after the passage of the BHCA, the prohibition of commer-
cial ownership of banks was not absolute.  Any company could still
own one bank.55  The BHCA was aimed at preventing “bigness” in
banking, and these one-bank holding companies were not considered
a threat until they started to grow in size and number.56  As one-bank
holding companies started to grow and expand, the BHCA was
amended to cover them as well.57  In 1970, the BHCA was amended to
restrict commercial firms from owning even one bank unless the firm
met the definition of a Bank Holding Company (“BHC”) under the
nonbanking business, “contravened both history and logic”).  In the Senate hearings, the Board
was unable “to identify any actual problem of ‘conflicts of interests.’” Id. at 498 (citing Control
of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on S. 880, S. 2350, and H.R. 6227 Before the Subcomm. of
the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 64–65 (1955) (statement of J.L.
Robertson, member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)).  When a member of
the Board was questioned whether existing “banks controlled by the bank holding companies
make loans to industrial enterprises which the bank holding companies own,” he replied that he
could not “think of a single violation.” Control of Bank Holding Companies, supra, at 64 (state-
ment of J.L. Robertson, member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).  When
pressed further to name specific harms caused by banking and commercial affiliations, he was
unable to do so, but rather stated that “Congress should take into consideration the potentiali-
ties involved.” Id. at 65.
53 Felsenfeld, supra note 30, at 67.
54 S. REP. NO. 84-1095, at 2 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2482, 2483 (citing the
following as purposes of the BHCA: “(1) [t]he unrestricted ability of a bank holding company
group to add to the number of its banking units, making possible the concentration of commer-
cial bank facilities in a particular area under a single control and management; and (2) [t]he
combination under single control of both banking and nonbanking enterprises, permitting depar-
ture from the principle that banking institutions should not engage in business wholly unrelated
to banking”); see also Felsenfeld, supra note 30, at 79.
55 Carl A. Sax & Marcus H. Sloan III, Legislative Note, The Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1208 (1971).
56 See id. at 1200.
57 Id. at 1213.
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BHCA.58  This amendment initiated the complete separation of bank-
ing and commerce in commerce.59
Despite the BHCA’s attempt at complete separation, there were
many commercial firms that owned and controlled banks through ex-
ceptions and loopholes in the BHCA.  For example, the BHCA de-
fined a bank as an institution that both accepted deposits and made
commercial loans.60  Many companies owned banks that engaged in
one activity and not the other.61  There were also many other types of
banks that did not meet the exact definition of a bank provided in the
BHCA.  These banks were referred to as “nonbank” banks.62  After
the passage of the 1970 amendment, “nonbank” banks became very
popular.63  In 1987, the Competitive Equality Banking Act
(“CEBA”)64 was passed to address this expansion.  CEBA broadened
the BHCA’s definition of bank to cover many nonbank banks, making
their owners subject to the activity restrictions of the BHCA.65  Com-
mercial firms were forced to either divest themselves of their banking
affiliates or become BHCs and stop their commercial activities.66
However, even CEBA did not cover all commercial ownership of
banks.67  CEBA grandfathered many banks already owned by com-
mercial firms and provided several substantial exceptions to its defini-
tion of a bank.68  Moreover, CEBA allowed exceptions for other
nonbanks such as credit card banks, foreign banking institutions, sav-
ings associations, trust companies, credit unions, industrial banks, and
banks in liquidation.69  Thus, a commercial firm could still own a
58 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101, 84 Stat.
1760.  This would require, inter alia, that the firm “divest [itself] of non-banking affiliates and
refrain from future acquisition of such enterprises.”  Sax & Sloan, supra note 55, at 1206.  “Two
large conglomerates that acquired banks and attracted Congress’s attention were Sperry &
Hutchinson, which owned three department stores and companies that manufactured carpets,
furniture and textiles, and Montgomery Ward, which operated one of the largest chains of retail
stores in the nation.”  Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 14, at 1568.
59 See Sax & Sloan, supra note 55, at 1228.
60 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, sec. 101, § 2(c), 84 Stat. at 1762.
61 Haubrich & Santos, supra note 17, at 147.
62 Id.
63 See id.
64 Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA) of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101, 101 Stat.
552, 554 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (2006)) (defining banks as institutions insured by the
FDIC or that accept demand deposits and make commercial loans).
65 S. REP. NO. 100-19, at 2–6 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 489, 492–96.
66 Id.
67 Blair, supra note 12, at 99 (noting that CEBA “grandfathered” some existing nonbank
banks).
68 CEBA § 101, 101 Stat. at 554; Blair, supra note 12, at 99.
69 CEBA § 101, 101 Stat. at 554.  Industrial banks have also been referred to as Industrial
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banking entity, which could perform many of the functions of a bank,
but was not considered a bank by the BHCA.  After the passage of
CEBA, demand for these exempted nonbanks skyrocketed.70  Part III
addresses these entities and specifically analyzes the industrial bank,
its structure, and its relationship with commercial firms as a successful
example of a commerce-banking alliance.
The BHCA’s prohibition of commercial ownership of banks is an
outdated and unnecessary relic of history and needs to be reconsid-
ered.  The recent crisis has illuminated several glaring problems with
our current banking system and many of these problems can be reme-
died by allowing commercial firms to own banks.  Commercial firm
ownership of banks will naturally cure the problems of homogeniza-
tion, conglomeration in banking, and the incentives towards risktak-
ing.  A measured policy that allows commercial firms to own banks
can encourage the provision of banking services while avoiding the
moral hazards that are a seemingly permanent part of our current
banking policy.  Allowing commercial firms to own banks is an idea
whose time has come.
B. The BHCA Does Not Fit the Current Banking Landscape
Even if the fears that precipitated enactment of the BHCA had
been real enough to justify the Act, the banking industry in 1956 was
very different than it is now.  It was much easier to erect barriers to
entry then, when banks were defined by a few recognizable character-
istics.  The BHCA’s prohibition of commercial ownership of banks led
to some important changes in banking.  The BHCA spurred the evolu-
tion of nonbanks, which eventually blurred the lines of banking and
allowed commercial firms to operate bank-like structures.71  In addi-
tion, advances in the financial and capital markets and the need for
diverse funding sources led to alternative lending and investing struc-
tures that filled in the gaps left by traditional banks.72  Bank-like enti-
Loan Companies, but in the state of Utah, the statute governing the entities refers to them as
industrial banks. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 7-8-3 to -21 (LexisNexis 2006); see also Mehrsa
Baradaran, The ILC and the Reconstruction of U.S. Banking, 63 SMU L. REV. 1143, 1145 n.12
(2010).  “ILC” and “industrial bank” are used interchangeably throughout this Article.
70 Mindy West, The FDIC’s Supervision of Industrial Loan Companies: A Historical Per-
spective, SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, Summer 2004, at 5, 9.
71 Haubrich & Santos, supra note 17, at 147; see also Christian Johnson & George G.
Kaufman, A Bank By Any Other Name . . ., FED. RES. BANK CHI. ECON. PERSP., Fourth Quarter
2007, at 37, 37, 41.
72 See 1 DIV. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE
EIGHTIES—LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 5 (1997) (discussing the changes in the 1980s and noting
the expansion of banking alternatives and new funding sources).
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ties have emerged to provide many of the same services that were
once exclusively provided by banks.73
Banks were once at the center of all lending and investing activi-
ties, but today they must compete with a variety of commercial lend-
ers as well as the ever-accessible capital markets.74  Banks are no
longer the only source of liquidity as they once were75 due to the capi-
tal markets,76 the commercial paper markets,77 and various other non-
bank sources of loans and liquidity.  In addition, advances in
technology78 and the elimination of legal geographical barriers, such
73 In his seminal article, Are Banks Special?, E. Gerald Corrigan argues that banks are
special because they “offer transaction accounts,” provide the “backup source of liquidity for all
other institutions,” and “are the transmission belt for monetary policy.”  Corrigan, supra note 15,
at 7, 13–14.
74 See Blair, supra note 12, at 100.  Corrigan further elaborates that although each charac-
teristic is individually important, it is “the relationship among them that best captures the es-
sence of what makes banks special.”  Corrigan, supra note 15, at 7.
75 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, America’s Banking System: The Origins
and Future of the Current Crisis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 769, 772–73 (1991).  Additionally, Macey and
Miller walk through the three ways that banks used to have the “edge” on the market. Id.
Traditionally, banks were a unique financial intermediary with the ability to convert illiquid in-
vestments to liquid assets. Id. at 772.  Banks maintained central intelligence on information,
which gave them a competitive advantage in the costly process of assessing credit and investing
money. Id. at 772–73.  In the 1970s and 1980s, however, many large corporations switched from
bank loans to securitized debt.  Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Finan-
cial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REV. 215, 231–34.  Other lenders emerged over time, which removed the need for traditional
bank liquidity. See id.  Because some of these competitors, such as mutual funds, produced
higher yields to investors, customers started shifting funds from banks to these alternatives. Id.
76 Biagio Bossone, What Makes Banks Special?  A Study of Banking, Finance, and Eco-
nomic Development 48 (World Bank Fin. Sector Strategy & Policy Dep’t, Working Paper No.
2408, 2000), available at http://go.worldbank.org/68P6Q865Y0.  The rise of capital markets and
other sources of liquidity are a result of advances in technology that allow for the dissemination
of information to which banks had exclusive access in performing intermediary functions.  Ma-
cey & Miller, supra note 75, at 773.  There are many financial products that are unaffiliated with
banks that have gained popularity because of their efficiency, making banks less central and
“special” as a necessary financial intermediary. Id. at 774.
77 Commercial paper is an example of a “highly liquid, low-risk asset” and has become one
of the most important financial instruments in the past few decades.  Dusan Stojanovic & Mark
D. Vaughan, The Commercial Paper Market: Who’s Minding the Shop?, REGIONAL ECONOMIST,
Apr. 1998, at 6, available at http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=1758.  Com-
mercial paper functions much like an IOU, and companies deal these short-term debts to fund
day-to-day operations. Id. at 5. Commercial paper use increased in the 1980s and 1990s and
significantly reduced the amount of company spending that was previously financed through
bank loans. Id. at 6–7. After 1970, large corporations were moving en masse from bank loans to
the commercial paper market. Id. Large firms were able to meet their credit needs through
capital markets, and nonbank commercial loans offered competition to banks. Id.
78 The technology boom of the 1990s was as game changing for the banking sector as it was
for most of the business world.  Internet banking allows for heightened competition across state
and country borders. See Wilmarth, supra note 75, at 269.  Because of these advances, perform-
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as the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
of 1994,79 have effectively exposed banking to new competitors and
larger markets.80  Thus, banks are no longer the repository and origin
of all money, but merely one competitor in a larger market.81  Increas-
ingly, banks are one of many competitors that offer lending and in-
vesting options.  This trend in banking toward greater expansion,
competition, and flexibility runs counter to the BHCA’s requirement
that banks must be owned by BHCs that primarily engage in a laundry
list of what are considered core banking activities.82
Years of deregulation, coupled with market needs, have intro-
duced many new players into the banking world and have eroded pre-
viously impervious barriers between banking and commerce.  In
response, many have recently argued that core banking laws and sepa-
rations should be shored up.83  However, the proverbial genie is out of
ing transactions and distributing information is easier, cheaper, and more accessible to financial
entities other than banks. See id. at 297–98.  The technological advances of the 1980s and 1990s
allowed financial markets to draw from a wider spectrum of borrowers. Id. at 230.  Computer
and statistical tracking allowed nonbanks to evaluate and disseminate data about different kinds
of borrowers, a practice that previously had only been profitable to banks. See id. at 230–31.
Traditional banks faced competition as nonbank entities began providing fast and cost-effective
banking services. Id. at 231.
79 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
80 The Riegle-Neal amendment effectively withdrew geographic restrictions on banks. See
Stacey Stritzel, Note, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994:
Progress Toward a New Era in Financial Services Regulation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 161, 163,
170, 173 (1995).  Banks had previously used BHCs as vehicles for interstate banking, but with the
branching restrictions removed, banks could move freely on their own. Id. at 170, 173.  The
expansion of banks across state lines was aided by technological advancements. See Martha
Vestal Clarke, The Impact of Emerging Payment Systems and Products on Banking Competition
and the Competitive Analysis of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions, 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 161,
164–65 (1997) (explaining that virtual, online banking offers a wide range of services, including
account managing, bill pay, loan applications, investment accounts, and retirement planning).
81 Finance companies, securities firms, and nondepository lenders have also expanded into
the consumer loan market, providing fierce competition for consumer lending, which was tradi-
tionally monopolized by banks.  Wilmarth, supra note 75, at 238.  Firms can easily raise capital
by extending public offerings, where they rely on “market forces” rather than on intermediary
banks to value the investments. See Macey & Miller, supra note 75, at 773.  The emergence of
capital markets has encroached on the province of traditional banking by removing the need for
the bank to analyze investments; capital markets also give firms access to thousands of financial
analysts who can evaluate the public offering market.  Customers are not using a traditional
bank for all their banking needs anymore.  They are turning to nonbanks such as “thrifts, credit
unions, annuities, mutual funds, and other securities and insurance products.”  Lynn W. Woos-
ley, et al., Is Commercial Banking a Distinct Line of Commerce?, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA
ECON. REV., Fourth Quarter 2000, at 39, 52–53.
82 See Blair, supra note 12, at 108–09, 111.
83 See, e.g., MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINAN-
CIAL REGULATION (2009) (indicating that the current system is unable to deal with new financial
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the bottle, and it would be impossible and unwise to undo the natural
evolution of financial markets.  Regulators should focus on ordering
and controlling the world we are in rather than the banking world that
might have been.
In the wake of these changes in the financial world, the regula-
tory structure needs to adjust.  The idea that bank ownership should
still be governed by a structure developed fifty years ago due to fears
of banking monopolies is unreasonable.  Banks must compete with
several other business models, yet they are bound by antiquated dec-
larations of public fear.  In addition, outdated mandates of the past,
such as the BHCA, have caused several obstacles to sound banking
when applied to a changed banking landscape.
II. THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT AND THE BANKING CRISIS
Given the seriousness of the turmoil sweeping over the banking
system and how much worse the crisis could have been,84 it is no acci-
dent that Congress stepped in with sweeping reforms on the heels of
the banking crisis.  Indeed, Dodd-Frank, passed by Congress in July
2010, represents the most expansive change in financial regulation
since the 1930s.85  Dodd-Frank is comprehensive and addresses some
of the immediate causes of this crisis.86  However, it is uncertain
whether Dodd-Frank is enough or too much.  It ambitiously sets out
to reduce risk in the banking system and gird up our banks to resist
instruments); Jackie Calmes & Louis Uchitelle, Obama Will Seek Limits on Banks, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2010, at A1 (quoting Paul Volcker as advocating more separation of banking and com-
merce to help remedy the financial situation).
84 The financial crisis crippled our economy to the point that “banks could not operate
without government assistance, and businesses were unable to raise capital.” Hearing with Trea-
sury Secretary Geithner Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 31 (2010) (written testi-
mony of Timothy Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury).  Additionally, it was
more difficult for consumers to obtain loans than any time since the great depression. Id.
Amidst these concerns, the government responded with reforms and statutory regulations that
reduced the cost of credit, increased companies’ abilities to hire, reinvested in small businesses,
and helped clean up the financial statements of financial and banking institutions. Id. at 32.
These changes helped stabilize the financial system and helped to avoid a systematic failure of
the financial industry. Id.
85 President Obama described it as “the most far-reaching reform since the Great Depres-
sion.”  Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement from the President
on the Passage of Financial Reform (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/statement-president-passage-financial-reform.
86 See generally U.S. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF
SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
(2010), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_
Reform_comprehensive_summary_Final.pdf (describing the major provisions of the Dodd-Frank
Act).
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bubbles and shocks, but it is quite difficult to test its strength.  Be-
cause each crisis is unique, the real proof of the Dodd-Frank’s effec-
tiveness will not be adequately demonstrated until the next crisis.
Clearly, however, Dodd-Frank accomplishes many things.  For exam-
ple, it attempts to reduce systemic risk by regulating the activities that
can be conducted within a bank,87 ensures heightened disclosure,88 re-
quires more capital to offset risks,89 and creates overseers to monitor
systemically important financial firms.90  Although it attempts to re-
duce systemic risk, it does not address the adverse risk structure of
privatized gains and public losses inherent in our current banking
system.
In the debate leading up to the passage of Dodd-Frank, several
theories of banking reform were proposed.  Many of these proposals
were mired in regulation-speak, based on the assumption that regulat-
ing something would make it go away.91  However, unless the strong
incentive banks have to engage in risktaking is somehow diminished,
banking regulators will always be chasing innovation on Wall Street
that is aimed at increasing profits.
Although this Article does not aim to cure this risk structure, it
does propose one possible banking framework that does not suffer
from the moral hazards prevalent in banking.  Accordingly, this Arti-
cle argues that relaxing strict adherence to the principle of separation
of banking and commerce would reduce systemic risk.  For several
reasons, commercial ownership of banks could solve at least some of
the problems noted above.
The BHCA was intended to deter conglomeration in banking and
reduce systemic risk, but it has had just the opposite effect.92  Relaxing
the requirements of the BHCA, coupled with improved oversight,
would result in a more diverse and secure banking structure.  Easing
87 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 601–628, 124 Stat. 1376, 1596–1641 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
88 Id.
89 Id. § 606.
90 Id. §§ 151–156.
91 The Treasury and the Federal Reserve proposed reducing leverage by increasing the
amount of capital banks are required to hold.  David Wessel, Three Theories on Solving the ‘Too
Big to Fail’ Problem, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2009, at A2.  The second approach, which was incor-
porated into Dodd-Frank and dubbed the “Volcker Rule,” was to restrict the type of activities—
specifically proprietary trading—in which banks could engage.  Others pushed for a dismantling
of the largest banks—those deemed too big to fail (“TBTF”). Id.  Advocates of the latter strat-
egy argued that a bank that is TBTF should not be allowed to stand. Id.
92 See Note, The Demise of the Bank/Nonbank Distinction: An Argument for Deregulating
the Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 98 HARV. L. REV. 650, 656–58 (1985).
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some of the BHCA’s restrictions on commercial ownership of banks
could solve a few of the current problems plaguing the banking sys-
tem: banks are too large and too homogenized to resist a contagion,
and too structurally risk prone.93  This Part examines these three ma-
jor problems in banking that have been at least partly caused by the
BHCA and illustrates how commercial ownership of banks can miti-
gate them.
A. Banks Are Too Large
The restrictions of the BHCA have caused a conglomeration in
banking that has been further accelerated by the recent banking col-
lapse, an ironic result of an act meant to combat conglomeration in
banking.  Because the BHCA mandates that a holding company be
engaged only in banking and does not allow commercial firms to affili-
ate with or own banks, banks can only merge other banks.  The last
decade has seen a significant trend toward bank mergers, as they be-
gan to accelerate in the 1980s and continued through the 1990s.94
Since 1980, the number of FDIC-insured entities has declined from
16,00095 to 7417.96
The collapse of the subprime mortgage market in 2007 resulted in
a number of mergers among the biggest banks in the United States.97
93 See infra Part II.B.1 for a description of contagion as a result of homogenization.
94 See Edward Pekarek & Michela Huth, Bank Merger Reform Takes an Extended Phila-
delphia National Bank Holiday, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 595, 604 (2008).  Mergers were
possible despite the Bank Merger Act of 1960 (“BMA”), 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (2006), which was
originally enacted to support the BHCA’s procompetitive purpose.  Pekarek & Huth, supra, at
615.  However, a large loophole in the BMA allows for mergers if the anticompetitive effects are
outweighed by the public interest of “the convenience and needs of the community to be
served.” H.R. REP. NO. 86-1416 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1995.  Additionally, fed-
eral authorities relaxed the merger review standards after 1980 with the apparent attitude that
relaxed standards would encourage competition and allow larger, more efficient banks to absorb
smaller banks.  Wilmarth, supra note 75, at 250–51.
95 Pekarek & Huth, supra note 94, at 604.
96 Institution Directory, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/ (last up-
dated Nov. 10, 2011).
97 In 2008, in the wake of the crisis, stable financial firms such as Bank of America, Wells
Fargo, JPMorgan Chase, and other large banks bought failing or weakened banks.  Bank of
America acquired Countrywide, a mortgage provider facing potential failure due to the mort-
gage crisis, in January 2008.  Shannon D. Harrington & Hamish Risk, Bank of America Credit
Risk Increases on Countrywide Purchase, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2008, 5:38 PM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aRgBATAK.v4E.  In March, news that Bear
Stearns was close to filing bankruptcy led JPMorgan to step in at the behest of the federal gov-
ernment and acquire the failing investment bank at ten dollars per share.  American Banker
Staff, Year in Review: When It Seemed Things Couldn’t Get Worse . . ., AM. BANKER, Dec. 5,
2008, at 30.  In September 2008, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch, a move that federal
regulators leveraged to ensure that Merrill Lynch’s failure would not further bring down the
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Consolidation has led to domination of the market by a few institu-
tions.98  Currently, three banks—Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase,
and Wells Fargo—control over thirty-three percent of Americans’
bank deposits.99  The mortgage industry is dominated by Wells Fargo
and Bank of America,100 and five residential servicing firms now con-
trol over two-thirds of the nation’s housing debt.101  These large BHC
conglomerates control a staggering market share and are so dominant
in the banking sector that they have made it increasingly difficult for
smaller banks or new entrants in the market to compete.102  Even
though banking is still less concentrated than most other major Amer-
ican industries, this trend toward conglomeration is problematic.
The crisis led stronger banks to seek out failing banks to acquire
and consolidate,103 and as the downturn levels off, even more acquisi-
economy.  Steven Sloan, When A Job Becomes a Policy Lever, AM. BANKER, July 17, 2009, at 1.
The same month, JPMorgan made another acquisition; this time it bought the faltering firm
Washington Mutual.  Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, In Largest Bank Failure, U.S. Seizes,
Then Sells, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A1.  Caught in crisis, Morgan Stanley considered a
merger with Wachovia, the fourth largest bank.  Andrew Ross Sorkin & Eric Dash, Morgan
Stanley Is Said to Press for Merger with Wachovia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at C7.  But suffer-
ing its own losses from bad mortgages, Wachovia was pushed into a quick sale.  Eric Dash &
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Regulators Push for Sale of Wachovia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, at A15
(noting that Wachovia’s share price had plunged nearly seventy-four percent).  Citigroup and
Wells Fargo spent the end of 2008 competing for the ownership of Wachovia, but Wells Fargo
won with a $15.1 billion offer, beating Citi’s $2.16 billion offer.  Kevin Dobbs, Citi Deal Bought
Time for Wachovia, and for Wells, AM. BANKER, Oct. 6, 2008, at 2.
98 See Matt Ackermann, Big 3 Deposit Share Approaches 33%, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28,
2008, at 16; Kevin Dobbs & Paul Davis, Assessing the ’09 Outlook for Giants, AM. BANKER, Dec.
23, 2008, at 1; Shanker Ramamurthy & Suzanne Duncan, Viewpoint, Crisis Presents an Opportu-
nity for Reinvention, AM. BANKER, Dec. 3, 2008, at 10.
99 Ramamurthy & Duncan, supra note 98.
100 Kate Berry, Mortgages’ Big Two Are Too Big to Avoid, AM. BANKER, Sept. 28, 2009, at
1.
101 Paul Muolo, In the Servicing Market, the Biggest Get Bigger, AM. BANKER, Feb. 17,
2009, at 10.
102 Berry, supra note 100 (discussing soaring costs for smaller mortgage lenders).
103 Robert Barba, After Corus, Serial Buyer is Now Pausing to ‘Digest,’ AM. BANKER, Sept.
15, 2009, at 1 (discussing MB Financial’s acquisition of Corus bank in September 2009 and its
plan to “peek” at other, future acquisition opportunities); Robert Barba, Capitol of Mich. Re-
trenches with an Eye to Acquisitions, AM. BANKER, Oct. 17, 2008, at 1 (describing Capitol
Bancorp’s plan to consolidate seven branches into three and start “thinking more seriously about
acquisitions”); Dobbs & Davis, supra note 98 (reviewing a number of 2008 acquisitions including
U.S. Bancorp’s acquisition of Downey Financial Corp. and JPMorgan, and Chase’s acquisition of
Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual); Kevin Dobbs, Treasury Lends Hand to Nat City—PNC
Deal, AM. BANKER, Oct. 27, 2008, at 1 (reporting PNC’s takeover of failing National City in
October 2008); Alan Kline, N.J. Bank, Thrift Groups to Join Jan. 1, AM. BANKER, Dec. 12, 2008,
at 5 (covering New Jersey Bankers Association’s merger with the New Jersey League of Com-
munity Bankers at the beginning of 2009); Matthias Rieker, Profits Off, First Charter Prepping
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tions are anticipated.104  Banks that hope to gain momentum by in-
creasing their own presence, expanding their geographic reach, and
growing their capital are on the lookout for potential merging part-
ners.105  Indeed, mergers are a natural result of an economic down-
turn:106 when a bank starts to falter, it can hedge its losses by
combining with a stronger bank.107  After the recent crisis, many larger
banks were poised to acquire smaller institutions.108  The largest banks
in the country combined to create larger conglomerates, and regional
and national banks followed the same trend.109
Federal regulators have played a key role in encouraging bank
mergers during the recent recession.110  Regulators use acquisitions
“in times of distress to spread capital across the banking system to fill
in the weak spots.”111  The government has stepped in as an intermedi-
ary or sponsor of major acquisitions by, for example, encouraging
JPMorgan to buy Bear Stearns and offering Wall Street institutions
for New Owner, AM. BANKER, May 8, 2008, at 20 (reporting that Fifth Third Bancorp received
approval to acquire First Charter Corp.).
104 David Henry & Dakin Campbell, Get Ready for a Wave of Bank Mergers, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 20–26, 2010, at 51 (reporting that “conditions make the industry ripe for a
wave of takeovers,” even though the four largest banks “won’t be doing any significant buying”).
105 Robert Barba, Minn. Deal May Illustrate Tiny Consolidation Trend, AM. BANKER, Sept.
29, 2009, at 1 (describing an acquisition in which a Minneapolis–St. Paul bank having twenty-two
branches “would gain one branch in a suburb where it would like to be”).
106 Dino Mauricio, Viewpoint, Despite Turmoil, M&A Strategies Remain Viable, AM.
BANKER, June 6, 2008, at 10 (“Depressed valuations, fewer competing bids, and stronger negoti-
ating ability at the deal table will translate into attractive opportunities for banks to put excess
capital to work.”).
107 See Jenny Anderson, Andrew Ross Sorkin & Ben White, As Options Fade, Lehman Is
Said to Seek a Buyer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2008, at A1 (explaining that this was the hope of
Lehman Brothers when it considered selling itself after it hit record losses).
108 Kevin Dobbs, Buying, Selling, and the Question of Timing, AM. BANKER, Jan. 14, 2008,
at 7 (discussing rumors that JPMorgan Chase would acquire Washington Mutual, among others).
109 See Matthew L. Cantor, Viewpoint, Rethinking M&A Antitrust Enforcement, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 20, 2009, at 11 (“With many banks having sustained heavy losses of late, some
observers say a wave of financial institution consolidation may be upon us.”); see also supra note
97 and accompanying text.
110 Camden Fine, Viewpoint, The Bitter Fruit of Unchecked Consolidation, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 19, 2008, at 10 (“[F]or nearly 30 years, official government policy best articulated by the
Treasury and the Fed has encouraged and supported the consolidation of the entire financial
services spectrum, which has led to the dangerous ‘interconnectedness’ of mammoth institutions
worldwide.”).
111 Rob Cox, Editorial, Too Many Banks ‘Too Big to Fail,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at B2
(arguing that although government-encouraged mergers might provide stability in the short
term, such mergers threaten the financial system by facilitating “too big to fail” bailouts); see
also infra Part II.A.1.
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funds for acquisitions in the fear that more banks could fail unless
they were merged.112
Consolidation in banking was not limited to the largest banks.113
Small and midsized banks were left in a particularly weak and vulner-
able position due to the recent crisis, and many faced the prospect of
merging or perishing.114  This acceleration of mergers and small bank
failures has led to diminished numbers of these banks.115  The loss of
so many of these smaller banks affects the financing prospects of
many small and midsized businesses, which are the main customers of
these banks.116  Currently, there is a shortage of financing options for
these types of businesses as large banks conglomerate and chase after
higher-yielding investments.117  Thus, the very regulatory structure de-
signed to promote competition and discourage conglomeration has in
fact led to a structure where a few large and powerful banks control
the majority of the banking sector and the banking needs of entire
business segments go unmet.
112 In Bear Bailout, Fed Says It Tried to Avert Contagion, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2008, at C4
(reporting that the Fed “felt compelled to intervene because an ‘immediate failure’ of Bear
Stearns would bring about an ‘expected contagion’”).
113 The subprime crisis affected the housing industry and with housing projects drying up,
small banks’ usual clients stopped borrowing.  Eric Dash, Small and Midsize U.S. Banks Begin-
ning to Struggle in Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, at C3.  In addition, the Treasury
Department typically did not assist small banks through the Troubled Asset Relief Program,
given that the objective of the program was to keep big banks alive.  Robert Barba, The Real
‘Scarlet Letter’ Was Not Receiving Tarp, AM. BANKER, Sept. 17, 2009, http://www.american
banker.com/issues/174_180/real_scarlet_letter_not_receiving_tarp-1002155-1.html.  This left
small and midsized banks to fend for themselves, and some either disappeared, downsized, or
were swallowed up by bigger banks. Id.  Some private investors started buying up small failed
banks, and creating bigger bank companies.  Marissa Fajt, Tex. Buyout Group Has Two Deals,
Focus on Fort Worth, AM. BANKER, Mar. 24, 2008, at 4.  For example, Texas American Acquisi-
tion Inc. began buying up closing community banks in Forth Worth. Id.
114 See Rob Cox & Jason Bush, Red Flags Ahead for Smaller Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
2009, at B2.
115 After the major banks stabilized through mergers, small banks still struggled and small
bank failures accelerated in 2009.  Graham Bowley, More Small Banks Ailing as Recession Toll
Mounts, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at B3.  The 2007 crisis year saw only three bank failures.
Failed Bank List, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/ban-
klist.html (last updated Oct. 25, 2011).  But in 2008, the number had grown to 25, and in 2009,
140 banks failed. Id.  Most of the 140 were small banks. See Cox & Bush, supra note 114.  Many
small banks became easy candidates for acquisitions. See Dash, supra note 113.
116 See Dash, supra note 113.
117 Scott Medintz, Getting the Loan Officer on Your Side: Small Banks Will Lend if They
Understand the Business, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at B8 (describing the strategies small busi-
ness owners must employ to find financing as large banks have tightened their lending to small
businesses).
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1. “Too Big to Fail” Bailouts and Dodd-Frank
One particularly problematic result of the increased conglomera-
tion in banking is the implicit government promise that large firms will
be deemed “too big to fail” (“TBTF”) and aided by federal funds
when failures seem imminent.118  This implicit guarantee is troubling,
as it creates moral hazard and can lead to excessive risktaking.119  The
TBTF protection is also an incentive for conglomeration because it
rewards large banks with Federal Reserve protection—naturally, reg-
ulators may be more comfortable allowing smaller banks to fail.120
One of the provisions of Dodd-Frank promises to end future
bailouts of banks that are TBTF, but if BHCs continue to be large,
interconnected, and highly leveraged, the promise is not realistic.121
118 Section 141(a)(i)(C) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i)(I) (2006)),
essentially codified a TBTF policy by providing that the FDIC would protect uninsured deposi-
tors in large failing banks if the action is taken to prevent “serious adverse effects on economic
conditions or financial stability.” Id.; see also Wilmarth, supra note 75, at 300.  But describing a
firm as “too big to fail” is a bit of a misnomer because size is only one factor used in determining
if a bank’s failure will have “serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stabil-
ity.”  TBTF is also known as “too interconnected to fail” or “systemically important financial
institutions.”  John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the
Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 812 (2010); James B.
Thomson, On Systemically Important Financial Institutions and Progressive Systemic Mitigation,
8 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 135, 139 (2010).
119 For an overview of moral hazard, see generally Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout:
Regulating Systematic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183 (2009).
120 TBTF protection has caused the absorption of smaller banks by larger ones. See
Krishnamurthy V. Subramanian, Column, How to Fix Global Finance, FIN. EXPRESS (May 26,
2010, 8:04 PM), http://www.financialexpress.com/news/column-how-to-fix-global-finance/623548/
0; cf. Linda O’Connell, Can Community Banks Compete?, NW. FIN. REV., Apr. 15, 2001, at 6,
available at http://www.allbusiness.com/finance-insurance/896834-1.html (showing statistics that
small companies prefer small banks’ services and products).
121 Testifying before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben Bernanke was asked whether institutions that had become too large to manage should be
broken up. Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention
and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry
Comm’n, 45–47 (testimony of Byron S. Georgiou, Comm’r, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commis-
sion), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0902-
Transcript.pdf.  Chairman Bernanke responded that size is not the issue, but instead that
management’s ability to monitor and mitigate risk is. Id. at 47–48.  Bernanke also said that with
the passage of Dodd-Frank, “it would [not] be feasible for us to bail out firms the way we did
during the crisis.” Id. at 44–45.  Although the particular method of bailing out a financial institu-
tion has been curbed, however Bernanke seemingly did not want to take the stance that FDIC
Chairman Sheila Bair did in saying, “There is no wiggle room for bailouts here.  No more
bailouts.”  Dave Clark, FDIC Sees Rule Early Next Year on Dismantling Firms, REUTERS, Aug.
31, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/31/us-financial-regulation-resolution-idUSTRE
67U4GU20100931.  Rather, Bernanke’s written comments potentially foreshadow future politi-
cal pressure to rescue troubled institutions: “Few governments will accept devastating economic
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Experts have noted that future bailouts are still likely to occur.122  An
expectation of future bailouts also lingers in the financial sector.  Stan-
dard & Poor’s continues to rate four large financial institutions—Bank
of America, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Citigroup—as pos-
sessing “extraordinary sovereign support,” thus increasing their rating
quality.123  Experts note that bailouts will likely continue in private,
with the Federal Reserve directing the movements.124  Perhaps
bailouts will become even more likely under Dodd-Frank because
there are now formal procedures in place.125
costs if a rescue can be conducted at a lesser cost; even if one Administration refrained from
rescuing a large, complex firm, market participants would believe that others might not refrain in
the future.  Thus, a promise not to intervene in and of itself will not solve the problem.” Too Big
to Fail, supra, 21–22 (written statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testi-
mony/2010-0902-Bernanke.pdf; see also Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J.
435 (2011) (arguing that bailouts are a necessary response to systemic financial risk).
122 Mark W. Olson, Viewpoint, What Dodd-Frank Did and Did Not Accomplish, AM.
BANKER, July 30, 2010, http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/175_145/vp-olson-dodd-frank-
bill-1023102-1.html.  Mark Olson, former Federal Reserve board governor, explains that the
promise of no bailouts will not hold up for several reasons:
First, all government activities ultimately involve taxpayer dollars, and any financial
rescue will involve government intervention.  Second, there is an implicit presump-
tion in the construct of the special assessments provision to cover the cost of a
rescue that when one failure occurs other fund participants will be sufficiently
healthy to provide the funding.
Id.
123 STANDARD & POOR’S, THE FINANCIAL OVERHAUL BILL: THE RULES OF THE ROAD
HAVE CHANGED, BUT DETAILS SHOULD DEFINE BY HOW MUCH 2 (2010).  Standard and Poor’s
did note, however, that “it is possible based on several provisions in Dodd-Frank . . . that over
time we will change our view of sovereign support for U.S. banks to ‘support uncertain’ under
our methodology.” Id.
124 PETER J. WALLISON, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: CREATIVE DESTRUCTION, DESTROYED
(2010), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/FSO-2010-July-August-g.pdf; see Olson, supra
note 122.  In addition, Dodd-Frank shifts regulatory power from the FDIC to the Federal Re-
serve, which has the power (once it takes control of an institution) to strong-arm other large
institutions into buying the troubled assets, as was done when Bank of America was forced to
buy Merrill Lynch, despite large losses. WALLISON, supra.
125 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §§ 201–217, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442–1520 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.) (providing procedures for the “orderly liquidation” of large financial companies). But
see id. § 214, 124 Stat. at 1518–19 (mandating that “[t]axpayers shall bear no losses from the
exercise of any authority under this title” and that “[a]ll funds expended . . . shall be recovered
from the disposition of assets of such financial company, or shall be the responsibility of the
financial sector, through assessments”).
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2. Commercial Firm Ownership Versus Large
Banking Conglomerates
Commercial firm ownership can counteract the trend toward con-
solidation and offer small and midsized banks a chance of surviving
and even succeeding.  The BHCA is at least partly responsible for
causing these large and powerful banking conglomerates.  Allowing
commercial firms to own banks would counter conglomeration in two
ways: first, banks funded by large corporations could serve as compe-
tition to these BHC giants; second, based on the experience of current
commercially owned banks, these banks might better service the
needs of the small and midsized banking market.
The potential Wal-Mart bank outraged many in the industry—at
the time it was assumed that this would be the largest threat to small
banking across the country.126  But the recent crisis demonstrated that
the real threat to banking has come from within the sacred walls of
banking and not from the feared intruder.  It is the large BHCs that
have swallowed up the small banks, leaving them no other choice but
to merge.  Today, as the conglomerates have taken shape, funded by
the taxpayer, a Wal-Mart bank could be a welcome competitor.
If commercial firms could own banks, more small and midsized
banks could survive and serve the needs of small and midsized busi-
ness.  These banks could remain small because of the financial backing
of a corporation and would not need to be consumed by a BHC.  Cur-
rently, GE Capital, a banking subsidiary of GE that gained a charter
due to an industrial bank “loophole,” is thriving by meeting the needs
of small and midsized business borrowers.127  A recent article in The
New York Times lauded the firm as being one of the only remaining
lenders that services the small and midsized business-loan sector with
great success.128  GE Capital can do so because it is not forced to com-
pete with the large banks for its clientele.  Due to the backing of its
commercial parent, GE Capital is able to leave the herd of large banks
competing for the same customers and branch into an area that those
banks have left vacant.
126 See Greg Morcroft, Bank of America Assesses Wal-Mart Plan: CEO Sees Some Compet-
itive Threat from Industrial-Loan Bank, MARKETWATCH (May 2, 2006, 1:31 PM), http://www.
marketwatch.com/story/bank-of-america-ceo-sees-wal-mart-posing-some-threat (describing
Bank of America’s CEO as claiming that a Wal-Mart Bank’s “biggest threat would be to local,
community banks”).
127 See Eric Lipton, Citing Risks, U.S. Seeks New Rules For Niche Banks: Industry Resists
Move, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2009, at A1.
128 Id.
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These small and midsized banks could resist an otherwise fatal
financial contagion, such as a failed product that threatens to wreak
havoc on a bank’s delicate balance sheet, because they would be able
to rely on the backing of a parent company that serves as a true source
of strength.129  Parent firms with stable cash flow would be able to
support a subsidiary bank’s liquidity problems.130  This would be espe-
cially important during times of financial contagion, when regulators
are most concerned about the survival of banks.  Moreover, allowing
commercial firms to buy troubled banks would decrease the likelihood
that such banks would be absorbed into giant financial conglomerates,
as is likely today.
B. Homogenization and Correlation
The recent banking crisis exposed many flaws in the U.S. banking
system and in the government’s ability to regulate it effectively.
Among the most disturbing of these revelations was that our current
banking structure is too interconnected to resist the spillover effect of
systemic shocks as competitors plunge into economic collapse.  Given
what has transpired, it is not surprising that many have described the
financial system as dominos ready to fall,131 or as a house of cards that
was easily toppled when one or two cards fell.132  As is described be-
low, allowing commercial firms to own banks provides a potential de-
fense against widespread financial panic caused by contagion.
1. The Current Banking System Leaves Individual Banks Ill
Equipped to Deal with Contagion
Competition among large banks has caused a homogenization of
products and assets.  This homogenization contributes to a contagion
effect among the commercial banking sector.133  For example, leading
up to the recent crisis, many large banks that were previously not in-
terested in investing in subprime mortgage products could no longer
stay away from these high-yield securities; they needed to keep up
with their competitors and their businesses were built around con-
129 Baradaran, supra note 69, at 1185–87.
130 Id.
131 NewsHour: Examining the Roots of U.S. Economic Woes (PBS television broadcast
Mar. 21, 2008) (using a “falling dominos” analogy to describe the fallout of the financial system).
132 House of Cards (CNBC television broadcast Feb. 12, 2009) (using a “house of cards”
analogy to describe the events).
133 See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment
Bank Regulation, 85 IND. L.J. 777, 799 (2010).
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tracts and exchanges with their counterparts.134  Large banks were
forced to compete with other large banks by adopting similar practices
and accumulating similar financial products.
Banks often “herd” to the same types of assets in order to com-
pete.135  This behavior causes bank holdings to become highly corre-
lated, which means that they are more likely to stand or fall
together.136  Herding is evidenced through lending strategies: lending
to similar industries, specializing in certain products, or lending to
similar sets of customers.137  Bankers also have an incentive to invest
in assets that are highly correlated with their counterparts’ invest-
ments because regulators are unlikely to allow one firm to fail when
all the correlated firms would also be affected.138  This creates a “too
many to fail” problem.139  Such herding behavior was evidenced dur-
ing the recent financial crisis in the form of overinvestment in sub-
prime and other mortgage-related assets.140
Whatever the motivation or method, herding behavior creates
highly correlated assets in the banking sector, which increases sys-
temic risk.  The high correlation of assets makes it difficult to ensure
the health of the banking system by regulating individual banks.  Indi-
vidually, each bank may not pose a systemic risk, but collectively they
might.141
Thus, the assets held by major banks and BHCs are positively
correlated with each other, which means that they move up or down at
the same time.142  Holding positively correlated assets in a portfolio
amplifies both gains and losses, which increases (or at least fails to
reduce) risk in the portfolio because of a lack of diversification.143
This risk could be reduced by diversifying assets among sectors so that
134 Wilmarth, Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 14, at 1032, 1035.
135 Some propose that due to “information contagion,” which increases depositors’ ex-
pected returns from a surviving bank when deposits are transferred from a failed bank, the
environment is better for a surviving bank when other banks survive as well, than if one bank
survives and another bank fails.  Thus, banks consciously invest in correlated assets to ensure
that the optimal environment exists. See Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, Information
Contagion and Bank Herding, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 215 (2008).
136 Id. at 228.
137 Id.
138 Thomson, supra note 118, at 140.
139 Id.
140 Id.; see also Andrew Kahr, Column, Blame ‘Systemic Risk’ on Groupthink, AM.
BANKER, Oct 12, 2010, at 9.
141 Thomson, supra note 118, at 140.
142 See David M. Darst, THE ART OF ASSET ALLOCATION 65–66 (2d ed. 2008).
143 See id. at 89–90.
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they are either negatively correlated or uncorrelated with their own
assets.  Commercial firms can provide much needed diversity.
The close companion of correlation in the banking sector is called
“contagion,” which is “the spillover of the effects of shocks from one
or more firms to others.”144  Contagion in banking is theorized to be
more potent than contagion in other sectors, with potential to spread
farther and more quickly.145  Thus, the house of cards or dominos
analogies were accurate depictions of what happened to banks as their
highly correlated products began to fail.
Conversely, commercial firms are generally less susceptible to
contagion,146 and therefore, a bank owned by a commercial firm
would pose less risk of contagion to the financial system.  Although
the bank may suffer runs when bad news is exposed, its commercial
parent company could absorb the effects of runs through reduced rev-
enue or higher prices, slowing the speed of contagion and improving
the bank’s chances of survival.  For example, a Wal-Mart bank could
easily become infected with a financial contagion such as defaulting
asset-backed securities.  However, its parent’s operations would not
be similarly affected because retail sales are not directly linked to the
financial markets.  Therefore, it is possible for the parent company’s
steady revenue stream to buoy a partner or subsidiary bank during a
banking crisis.147
In banking, there is also a danger of perceived or assumed conta-
gions.  This is true because depositors are less likely to be informed
about the financial condition of banks, and there is less noticeable dis-
tinction between products of one bank compared to another.148  Thus,
when one bank is believed to be on the brink of failure, it triggers
144 George G. Kaufman, Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence, 1994 J.
FIN. SERVICES RES. 123, 123; accord Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs,
Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 418 (1983) (“Consider a firm with illiq-
uid technology which issues very short-term bonds as a large part of its capital structure.  Sup-
pose one lender expects all other lenders to refuse to roll over their loans to the firm.  Then, it
may be his best response to refuse to roll over his loans even if the firm would be solvent if all
loans were rolled over.  Such liquidity crises are similar to bank runs.”).
145 Kaufman, supra note 144, at 124 (“In comparison to other industries, absent federal
deposit insurance, bank failure contagion is hypothesized to: 1. occur faster; 2. spread more
broadly within the industry; 3. result in a larger number of failures; 4. result in larger losses to
creditors (depositors) at failed banks; and 5. spread more beyond the banking industry and cause
substantial damage to the financial system as a whole and the macroeconomy.”).
146 See id. at 126 (noting that problems with commercial companies rarely have a long-term
harmful impact on their competitors).
147 See Baradaran, supra note 69, at 1187.
148 Kaufman, supra note 144, at 127.
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concern about the solvency of other banks.149  Other-
wise–uncorrelated-risk exposures of a few similarly situated banks can
become highly correlated during times of financial distress.150  This is
less likely to occur among commercial firms, where information is
more readily available and the differences between firms are more
readily apparent.151  Additionally, commercial firms are generally bet-
ter capitalized than banks and can withstand bigger adverse shocks,
reducing the contagion spread as compared with banks.152
Evidence of contagion among banks still exists.153  During the re-
cent crisis, many banks failed because they did not have enough assets
that were unaffected by the housing crisis to counterbalance their
losses.154  And once one firm experienced a run or near crisis, the fear
caused a contagion through the entire banking system.  For example,
in 2008, when Washington Mutual collapsed, Wachovia effectively ex-
perienced a bank run the very next day.155  The FDIC was forced to
step in and facilitate the merger of Wachovia bank with Citigroup,
leaving the Wachovia holding company a shell without any
subsidiary.156
Exactly how serious the problem of bank contagion is remains
unclear.  Empirical studies on these theories are mixed; some suggest
banks are only very slightly vulnerable, if at all, in relation to other
firms with respect to contagion and failure,157 while others suggest that
149 Id.
150 Thomson, supra note 118, at 140.
151 Kaufman, supra note 144, at 128–29.
152 Id. at 133.
153 “The symptoms are familiar: too many construction loans made when money was plenti-
ful and real-estate values defied gravity.  And now the disease that has killed more than 200
banks is spreading to another part of the U.S.  Six banks in Washington state have failed this
year, while about one-fourth of the banks and savings institutions based there are operating
under toughened regulatory scrutiny known as ‘cease-and-desist’ orders, according to the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corp.”  Robin Sidel & Peter Lattman, Bank Contagion Spreads to North-
west, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2010, at B1.
154 See Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Reg-
ulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 172–73 (2009)
(explaining that in the recent crisis, risk correlation within mortgage-backed securities meant
that “when losses do occur, they can be massive,” which can also affect assets that do not appear
to be directly correlated with the risk).
155 Rick Rothacker & Kerry Hall, Wachovia Faced a ‘Silent’ Bank Run, CHARLOTTE OB-
SERVER, Oct. 2, 2008, at 1A (reporting that clients started pulling money out and leaving just
below the FDIC insured minimum of $100,000).
156 Id.  Wells Fargo and CitiGroup ended up competing for the chance to buy Wachovia,
with Wells Fargo ultimately winning the bidding war.  Michael J. de la Merced, Wells Fargo Wins
the War for Wachovia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2008, at B1.
157 George Kaufman argues: “Are banks ‘special’ or ‘unique’ relative to other firms with
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contagion risk is clearly evident in banking.158  In any event, there is
some evidence that bank regulators treat contagion as a serious poten-
tial problem.  Although it is difficult to isolate the motivations of regu-
lators, it is widely believed that the FDIC bailout of Continental
Illinois in 1984 and the more recent bailout of Bear Stearns were mo-
tivated by fears of contagion throughout the financial system.159
2. Commercial Firms as a Source of Strength
The Federal Reserve looks to parent companies to be a “source
of strength” for their banks, which means a parent company “should
stand ready to use available resources to provide adequate capital
funds to its subsidiary banks during periods of financial stress or ad-
versity.”160  However, when ownership is limited to BHCs, the parent
companies will often struggle during times of financial distress as
much as the subsidiary bank because their assets are tied up in the
same financial markets.  Many BHCs are mere shell companies that
own various banking subsidiaries on which the BHCs’ financial health
depends.161
A better source of strength would be a commercial firm whose
revenues are not correlated with the weaknesses of a subsidiary bank.
Although the financial sector has been hit hard, many commercial
respect to failure as some argue?  The evidence reviewed in this article suggests that they may
be, but only slightly so, without federal deposit insurance, and even more slightly so, with such
insurance.”  Kaufman, supra note 144, at 143.  He concludes: “[B]ank failures with no or only
minimal losses to depositors and no interruptions in lending arrangements or the payments sys-
tem are neither more contagious nor more damaging than the failures of nonbank firms.” Id. at
144.
158 Dirk Schoenmaker, of the Ministry of Finance in the Netherlands, writes, “[T]he results
from our empirical study are consistent with the existence of contagion risk and are thus oppo-
site to those of [George Kaufman’s 1994 study].”  Dirk Schoenmaker, Contagion Risk in Bank-
ing, in RISK MEASUREMENT AND SYSTEMIC RISK: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND JOINT
CENTRAL BANK RESEARCH CONFERENCE 86, 87 (1998), available at http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/
cbrc/cbrc-03.pdf.  “The empirical results indicate that bank failures are dependent after control-
ling for macro-economic influences.  These results are consistent with the existence of contagion
risk in banking.  An initial failure could generate further failures without intervention by the
authorities.” Id. at 101.
159 Thomson, supra note 118, at 139.
160 Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources of Strength to Their Sub-
sidiary Banks, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707, 15,707 (Apr. 30, 1987) (policy statement).
161 For example, Citigroup has more than 170 subsidiaries on which it, the BHC parent,
depends for revenue.  Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), Exhibit 21.01 (Dec. 31, 2010)
(listing only Citigroup’s significant subsidiaries).  During the recent crisis, when its subsidiaries
were in trouble, Citigroup was unable to come to their aid because it was struggling itself. See
Eric Dash, U.S. Is Said to Agree to Raise Stake in Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at A1.
Instead, the Treasury Department bailed out Citigroup by buying a thirty to forty percent stake
in it. Id.
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firms have remained stable because “their credit arrangements are
generally medium- or long-term and not collateralized by assets that
can lose their value quickly.”162  In addition, these commercial firms
rely on a different revenue stream so when the financial markets are
suffering from failed products, such as Collateralized Debt Obliga-
tions (“CDOs”),163 a parent retail firm can still sell other goods to
meet a constant demand that is not dependent on the health of the
financial markets.  If commercial firms could own banks, they could
provide stability in a crisis by providing uncorrelated assets, diversity
of products, and a consistent revenue source.
When financial firms start to falter, they deteriorate rather
quickly, but commercial firms often have a long, drawn-out slide to-
ward bankruptcy.  Commercial firms are still subject to some
counterparty risk and contagion risk like financial institutions.164
However, failures of nonfinancial firms happen with less swiftness and
intensity.165  Financial firms operate with highly leveraged capital
structures as opposed to commercial firms’ more modest risk expo-
sures.166  Consequently, a commercial firm would likely pose less sys-
temic risk because the parent company would remain stable and
dampen the risks of contagion and correlated assets.  For example, it
took a matter of days for the financial giants Bear Stearns, Washing-
ton Mutual, and Lehman Brothers to collapse while many of the Na-
tion’s automakers, retail chains, and airlines have been teetering on
the brink of bankruptcy for years and even decades, because unlike
financial firms, their assets do not disappear overnight.167
162 Peter J. Wallison, Viewpoint, Collapse Shows Folly of Limiting Ownership, AM.
BANKER, Mar. 27, 2008, at 17.
163 For an explanation of CDOs, see infra note 187 and accompanying text.  For an in-depth
discussion of the involvement of CDOs in the subprime mortgage meltdown, see Steven L.
Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93
MINN. L. REV. 373, 375–76, 394–97, 401–03 (2008) (identifying anomalies and failures in the
financial markets that led to meltdown and examining various hypotheses for why they
occurred).
164 James Bullard et al., Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer, 91 FED. RES.
BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 403, 408–09 (2009).
165 Id. at 408 (explaining that failures of Enron, WorldCom, and several major airlines and
automakers throughout the last decade did not cause any major problems for anyone beyond the
stakeholders in those individual corporations).
166 Commercial banks typically have a leverage ratio (debt/total equity) of around twelve;
investment banks can have leverage ratios of twenty-five or higher. See id. at 409.  By compari-
son, the typical S&P 500 Corporation has a leverage ratio of around two and one-half.
Morningstar Investing Classroom, Course 207: Leverage, MORNINGSTAR, http://news.morning
star.com/classroom2/printlesson.asp?docId=2936&CN=COM (last visited Oct. 27, 2010).
167 See Kaufman, supra note 144, at 125.
416 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:385
Banks have illiquid assets (loans) and highly liquid liabilities (de-
posits), making them susceptible to runs.  This illiquidity and vulnera-
bility increases systemic risk.168  By contrast, commercial firms
typically have medium- to long-term liabilities (loans) and relatively
liquid assets (inventory) that do not lose their value quickly.169  While
banks struggle to use long-term assets like loans to offset short-term
liabilities like demand deposits, commercial paper, and repurchase
agreements,170 many commercial firms have inflowing cash from the
sale of their goods or services.  By contrast, banks susceptible to fund-
ing shortages and “runs” may be forced to sell assets in a fire sale to
meet short-term liquidity requirements.171
An illustrative example of this relationship is the interaction be-
tween the few bank-owning commercial firms struggling in bankruptcy
and the stability of their subsidiary banks.172  As the commercial par-
ents slowly failed or reorganized, their banks remained healthy and
were even able to count on their struggling parent as a source of
strength.173
A commercial parent of a bank could serve as a stopgap for losses
when its subsidiary bank falters.  It could perform the same protective
function that the Federal Reserve and the FDIC provide for failing
banks.  This more stable and less correlated business model could stop
a financial contagion from overpowering the subsidiary bank.  Thus, a
168 Bullard et al., supra note 164, at 409.
169 Wallison, supra note 162.
170 Bullard et al., supra note 164, at 409.
171 Forum to Explore the Causes of the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis
Inquiry Comm’n 5 (2010) (written statement of Randall Kroszner, Norman R. Bobins Professor
of Economics, University of Chicago Booth School of Business), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0226-Kroszner.pdf.
172 See Baradaran, supra note 69, at 1180–82.
173 See id.  One particularly clear example is the success of the industrial bank controlled by
commercial firm Conseco, Inc., even while its parent company was experiencing bankruptcy.  As
the FDIC has explained,
Despite the financial troubles of its parent and the parent’s subsequent bank-
ruptcy[,] . . . Conseco Bank’s corporate firewalls and the regulatory supervision
provided by Utah and the FDIC proved adequate in ensuring the bank’s safety and
soundness.  In fact, $323 million of the $1.04 billion dollars received in the bank-
ruptcy sale of Conseco Finance was in payment for the insured ILC—Conseco
Bank, renamed Mill Creek Bank—which was purchased by GE Capital.  As a testa-
ment to the Conseco Bank’s financial health at the time of sale, the $323 million
was equal to the book value of the bank at year-end 2002.
Blair, supra note 12, at 114 (footnotes omitted); see also Patrick Fitzgerald, Lehman Seeks OK to
Inject Cash to Save Banks, AM. BANKER, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.americanbanker.com/syndi-
cation/-372607-1.html.
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commercial parent can serve as a source of strength to a struggling
bank in a more effective way than a BHC.
C. The Current Banking Model Creates Incentives for Risktaking
The BHCA model fosters systemic risk for several reasons.  As
explained above, the BHCA model creates incentives for firms to
grow bigger: failed banks are purchased by bigger banks, and implicit
government support for banks that are too big to fail creates an incen-
tive to grow even larger to take advantage of the capital subsidy cre-
ated by the implicit guarantee.174  Moreover, consolidation naturally
increases risks because it leads to less diversity of products and play-
ers.175  In addition, the current banking system incentivizes banks to
take excessive risks and understate these risks.
Moral hazard is created any time an actor gets the benefit of prof-
its without bearing the full risk of loss.176  The banking industry suffers
from a well-known moral hazard problem caused primarily by state
support of banks.177  This moral hazard causes banks to take risks they
would not take if they bore the full risk of loss.  In simplest form, a
bank makes a profit by taking deposits that carry a low rate of interest
and investing or loaning out these funds at a higher rate of interest.178
Banks have an incentive to act in ways that increase the margin be-
tween the amount being paid out to depositors and the amount being
collected from investments.179  One way to do this is to invest deposi-
tor money in funds that bear more risk and have a higher yield.180  As
rational actors, banks weigh the benefits of greater risk against the
potential losses.181  However, banks do not suffer the full conse-
174 See supra Part II.A; see also Wilmarth, supra note 75, at 445.
175 See Wilmarth, supra note 75, at 445.
176 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247,
255–56 (2010) (“There is a fundamental, and now well-understood, moral hazard problem in
banks.  Those who provide equity capital have an excessive incentive to take risk.  They will
capture the full upside, while some of the downside will be borne by the government as insurer
of deposits if the bank goes bankrupt.” (footnotes omitted)); Okamoto, supra note 119, at 204
(“Moral hazard arises when an actor does not bear all of the consequences of his actions.  It is
particularly acute when he can profit by taking risks that he does not fully bear.  Asset managers
who profit from the gains earned using other people’s money face a moral hazard.”).
177 See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 176, at 255 n.19.  State support of banks comes in
many forms: asset purchase, capital and liquidity injections, debt guarantees, and deposit insur-
ance. See HALDANE & ALESSANDRI, supra note 5, at 3–4.
178 See Okamoto, supra note 119, at 192–93.
179 See id.
180 See id. at 185.
181 See id.
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quences of loss because the losses consist of depositors’ money that is
protected by the FDIC fund.182
This naturally leads banks to take greater risks in order to in-
crease their profits.  This structure leads to a form of the tragedy of
the commons, as banks are led to take advantage of risk-laden, but
highly profitable, products with little concern for externalities in the
broader market.  Because banks do not have direct ownership of the
assets and do not suffer the long-term losses associated with too much
risk, they have an incentive to exploit certain products and services.183
Indeed, banks with “no skin in the game” are not properly incen-
tivized to avoid risks.184  This problem exists when the players who
decide how much risk to assume are not affected by the loss.185  Banks
qualify as such players because they invest depositors’ money but
rarely their own.
When a failure occurs, limited liability protects bank managers,
and the products are sold off to other banks without any reputational
stigma attached to the portfolio or manager.186  As a result, banks also
have a weakened incentive to protect the goodwill and reputation as-
sociated with assets under their control.  In addition, the events lead-
ing up to the subprime mortgage crisis demonstrate how banks can
have an incentive to understate or even conceal the risk of their in-
vestments.  A common practice among banks, like Washington Mu-
tual, was to originate loans and then sell them to a CDO pool.187
Washington Mutual created risky loans and sold them right away188
182 See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 176, at 255–56.
183 See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 163, at 387–90 (discussing how the “originate-and-dis-
tribute” model of the mortgage industry created a moral hazard that may have led mortgage
originators to create excessive risk).
184 See Karl S. Okamoto, Point of View, Skin in the Game, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, at
52.
185 Id.
186 See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 176, at 252.  Haldane and Alessandri point out:
“In the early days of banking, liability was not just unlimited; it was often as much personal as
financial.  In 1360, a Barcelona banker was executed in front of his failed bank, presumably as a
way of discouraging generations of future bankers from excessive risk-taking.” HALDANE &
ALESSANDRI, supra note 5, at 8.
187 Okamoto, supra note 119, at 209; see also Okamoto, supra note 184, at 52 (“Basically,
the way [CDOs] work is that a sponsor pools together a large group of mortgages or other
financial assets.  The sponsor then issues tranches of securities that represent a series of claims
against the pool.  Because of the quite legitimate magic of diversification, the pool of assets is,
indeed, more valuable than the sum of its parts.  The sponsor makes money by creating that
magic.”).
188 Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of High Risk Home Loans: Hearing Before
the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental
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and was rewarded based on the volume of loans, regardless of the
level of risk associated with the loan.189  Therefore, “[i]t was in
WaMu’s interest to downplay the credit quality issues of any particular
loan so long as it did not jeopardize the ability to resell the loans it
was originating.”190
Moreover, FDIC deposit insurance creates an additional moral
hazard problem that is unavoidable for banks because deposit insur-
ance does not incentivize bank customers to place their deposits in the
“safest” bank.  The FDIC currently insures up to $250,000 per deposi-
tor for losses due to bank failure.191  Without the backing of FDIC
insurance, depositors would have an incentive to perform careful re-
search prior to depositing funds and would thereafter take measures
to ensure prudence in investments.  However, depositors who are
guaranteed reimbursement for any losses due to bank failure have lit-
tle or no incentive to research the bank and its investing practices, nor
do they have an incentive to ensure prudent investing by those en-
trusted with their money.192  Thus, a moral hazard is created as banks
do not have a need or incentive to convince their customers that they
are effectively managing risk.
1. Problems with Regulation
Because banks lack the natural incentives to avoid excessive risk
in their investments and individual depositors lack the natural incen-
tives to research banks and hold them accountable, the burden of reg-
ulation lies entirely on third parties.  Regulators are outsiders of the
firm and therefore have extreme difficulty understanding the risk ex-
posure of a given bank.193  This disadvantage is amplified as banks get
bigger and, some argue, become too big to regulate.194  Because of this
informational disadvantage, regulators often struggle to create regula-
tions that take into account all possible outcomes, and sometimes
these regulations can actually lead to unexpected and devastating
results.
Affairs, 111th Cong. 5–8 (2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigations).
189 Okamoto, supra note 119, at 209.
190 Id.
191 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 335, 124 Stat. 1376, 1540 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(e)).
192 Cf. HALDANE & ALESSANDRI, supra note 5 (arguing that banks have an incentive to
take risks and be overleveraged because of state support of banking).
193 Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 176, at 281.
194 Id.
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One example is found in the United States in the years leading up
to the recent crisis.  Regulators required U.S. banks to work under a
regulatory leverage ratio, which means that they were limited in the
amount of liabilities they could set against their assets.195  However,
because banks stood to gain a lot more profit from the upside of
higher risk, they increased the riskiness of their liabilities so that they
could maintain the same leverage ratios and still attempt to increase
profits.196  In order to get a higher return on equity, many banks in-
creased the amount of risk in their asset pools by using, for example,
mortgage-backed securities and then subprime mortgages that were
bundled into mortgage-backed securities.197  When these high-risk as-
sets fell into default, the banks suffered tremendous losses.198  Thus,
although regulators were trying to force banks to reduce risk expo-
sure, they led banks toward different types of risk that ended up caus-
ing financial devastation.  The regulators could not diminish the lure
of higher leverage and heightened exposure.  Indeed, some scholars
argue that increased bank regulation will lead to weaker banks be-
cause regulators will too often focus on mandated ratios and numbers,
and miss the real risks.199
As discussed, banks also have an incentive to conceal risks, mak-
ing it even more difficult for regulators to detect potential problems.200
Further, banks have a greater financial incentive to discover and ex-
ploit regulations than regulators do to discover malfeasance, making
banks perpetually a step ahead of regulators.  If a bank finds a way to
gain a competitive advantage, the result could lead to huge profits.201
For example, if a bank could find a way to make an additional $1
billion in profit each year, it would be rational for it to spend any
amount up to $1 billion to discover this method.  The regulator, on the
other hand, does not benefit any more for discovering the bank’s bad
behavior than if it were to ignore the problem, and regulatory agen-
195 HALDANE & ALESSANDRI, supra note 5, at 6.
196 See Charles W. Calomiris, Financial Innovation, Regulation, and Reform, 29 CATO J. 65,
66 (2009) (“There is no doubt that the financial innovations associated with securitization and
repo finance were at least in part motivated by regulatory arbitrage.”).
197 HALDANE & ALESSANDRI, supra note 5, at 10.
198 Id.
199 See, e.g., Okamoto, supra note 119, at 211 (“[H]ow do we keep ourselves safe from
financial turmoil?  In the end, I am not certain we can, and I am almost certain that trying too
hard could be worse.”); id. at 211 n.93 (“As Justice Breyer admonishes, ‘modesty is desirable in
one’s approach to regulation.’” (quoting STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 184
(1982))); see also STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 184–88 (1982).
200 See supra text accompanying notes 183–85.
201 See Okamoto, supra note 119, at 208–09.
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cies are often insufficiently funded.202  We should therefore expect to
see a largely disproportionate amount of resources being spent on dis-
covering and exploiting regulations compared to resources spent on
preventing such behavior.203
2. Commercial Firms and “Skin in the Game”
It is easy to see how commercial ownership of banks could solve
the moral hazard or “skin in the game” problem discussed above.
When a commercial firm owns a bank, its assets are on the line and it
is forced to internalize the downside of the bank’s risks.  In the past,
when a commercial firm has attempted to own a bank (such as an
industrial bank) through one of the limited exceptions in the BHCA,
the firm has typically entered into a capital guarantee contract with
the FDIC requiring the firm to pay the liabilities of the bank in the
event of a failure before FDIC payout.204  If the BHCA’s require-
ments were relaxed, as this Article proposes, and commercial firms
were allowed into banking, this type of contract would be a precursor
to any ownership arrangement.  Without such an agreement, commer-
cial owners would not fare much better than BHCs that do not have
assets of their own.  It is this imposition of liability that causes the
benefits of the commercial alliance to be realized.  In addition, cross-
guarantee liability could be imposed whereby all the affiliates of a
given firm would also be responsible for the bank’s liabilities.205
202 See James A. Fanto, The Role of Financial Regulation in Private Financial Firms: Risk
Management and the Limitations of the Market Model, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 29,
39–40 (2008).
203 For example, in anticipation of the Volcker Rule, some firms moved their proprietary
traders onto desks that trade with company clients, blurring the lines between a proprietary
trade and one made on behalf of clients.  Aaron Lucchetti & Jenny Strasburg, What’s a ‘Prop’
Trader Now?, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2010, at C1.
204 For an example of such a contract, see Capital Maintenance and Liquidity Agreement,
Parent Company Agreement, and Passivity Agreement, Marlin Bus. Bank (Proposed) (Fed. De-
posit Ins. Corp. Mar. 20, 2007), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/bankdecisions/depins/Mar-
linAgreements.pdf.
205 This arrangement exists with BHCs, but is usually not enforceable because often the
entire ship sinks at once. See Letter from Donald E. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Deposit. Ins. Corp.,
to Senator Robert F. Bennett (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/
future_bennett.html (explaining cross-guarantee liability vis-a`-vis industrial banks and tradi-
tional banks).  Mandating cross-guarantee liability essentially forces the commercial parent to
internalize the costs otherwise borne by the FDIC.  The effect is similar to that proposed by
Alan Greenspan in which he advocates requiring banks to hold bonds that automatically convert
to equity when equity capital falls below a certain threshold. See Subprime Lending and Securi-
tization and Government Sponsored Enterprises, supra note 8, at 11.  The increased prices of such
bonds cause the stakeholders to internalize the costs, materially reducing moral hazard. See id.
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Forcing ownership of risk ensures that a commercial parent has
“skin in the game,” thus creating a natural incentive for reduced
risktaking.  Without the assurance of government bailouts, firms
would bear a greater share of the losses if they were to fail, thereby
reducing moral hazard.  As Warren Buffett aptly advised in an unre-
lated context, firms must be forced to “eat [their] own cooking.”206
III. MIXING BANKING AND COMMERCE
Although it is generally presumed that there is a distinct line be-
tween banking and commerce, the reality is that banking and com-
merce have been successfully mixed in many instances, without
impairing the integrity of the bank or the commercial firm.  This has
been done both with FDIC-insured depository institutions and with
bank-like services offered through non–FDIC-insured commercial
firms.207  Recently, private equity firms have begun to enter the bank-
ing fray through an FDIC program that encourages such firms to
purchase failing banks.208
There are two ways a traditional commercial firm can own an
FDIC-insured depository institution.209  The first is to own a single
thrift as a unitary thrift holding company.210  Unitary thrift holding
206 Buffett recently explained one of his investments by saying: “In short, we eat our own
cooking . . . no other testimonial means more.”  Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the
Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 12 (Feb. 26, 2010),
available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2009ltr.pdf; cf. MARK TIER, THE WIN-
NING INVESTMENT HABITS OF WARREN BUFFETT & GEORGE SOROS 230–32 (2005) (explaining
that a good measure of an investor’s confidence in his investments is how much of his own
money he puts on the line).
207 See ILC’s—a Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 208
(2006) (testimony of George Sutton, Esq., on behalf of the Securities Industry Association); O.
EMRE ERGUNGOR & JAMES B. THOMSON, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, INDUSTRIAL
LOAN COMPANIES (2006), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Commentary/2006/
1001.pdf.
208 See Frank Righeimer Martin, Note, Private Equity Investment in Failed Banks: Appro-
priate Investors Welcome, 14. N.C. BANKING INST. 403 (2010); Joe Adler, PE Investors Settle for
Small Slices, AM. BANKER, Apr. 14, 2010, at 13.
209 Previously there were three ways for a commercial firm to own a bank: through a One
Bank Holding Company, a Unitary Thrift Holding Company, or by owning an Industrial Loan
Company. See Larry D. Wall et al., The Final Frontier: The Integration of Banking and Com-
merce, Part I: The Likely Outcome of Eliminating the Barrier, 93 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA
ECON. REV., no. 1, 2008 at 1, 9–11, available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/
er08no1_wall.pdf.  The One Bank Holding Company “loophole” was closed, however, by
amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act in 1970. See id.  The other two options remain.
See id.
210 Id. at 11.  Commercial firms that own thrifts through unitary thrift holding companies
include E*Trade, H&R Block, John Deere, Macy’s, Nordstrom, Raymond James, Scottrade,
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companies can engage in any commercial enterprise as long as the
thrift meets certain activity restrictions.211  The second way a commer-
cial firm can own an FDIC-insured bank is to own an industrial bank,
as discussed below.212
Additionally, many commercial firms are increasingly engaged in
bank-like services to meet the demands of their customers.  Aided by
the Internet and a more open financial landscape, many commercial
firms have built business models based on bank-like services.  PayPal,
which was established at the height of the dot-com boom, is one suc-
cessful example of a bank-like entity that entered and dominated a
financial market previously controlled by banks.  PayPal is not a bank
and is not controlled by banking regulators, but for its more than 94
million customers, it provides bank-like services.213  PayPal allows
small traders to receive credit card payments or money wires and
serves as a repository for deposits by buyers.  Money in the account
can be withdrawn in a variety of ways.  PayPal is a fast-growing com-
pany operating in almost 200 markets worldwide with yearly revenue
of $3.4 billion.214
Technological innovation has led many commercial firms to more
holistically serve their customers, who increasingly demand financing
services.  Even without the benefit of deposits or FDIC insurance,
some commercial firms engage in lending activities either as an addi-
tional revenue source or as a complementary service to boost sales of
existing products.  These firms have found that in order to stay profit-
able and fully service their customers, they need to offer financial ser-
State Farm, T. Rowe Price, Allstate, and Edward Jones.  See Holding Company Search, OFF.
COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, http://www.ots.treas.gov/?p=HoldingCompanySearch (last visited
Nov. 19, 2011) (under “Bank Type” pull-down menu, select “Stock HC Owning Only Thrift(s)”).
Nordstrom converted its credit card bank into a federal savings bank in 2000 to offer a wider
variety of payment options to its customers.  Robert T. Nelson, Nordstrom Establishes Federal
Savings Bank, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at C2.
211 The most important restriction is the Qualified Thrift Lender Test, which basically re-
quires that approximately sixty-five percent of the thrift be dedicated to home- or mortgage-
related lending. See Historical Framework for Regulation of Activities of Unitary Savings and
Loan Holding Companies, OFF. THRIFT SUPERVISION, http://files.ots.treas.gov/48035.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2011).  Other restrictions are meant to ensure that the commercial firm does not
“unduly exploit the subsidiary thrift,” and include restrictions on transactions with affiliates,
loans to one borrower, anti-tying restrictions, restrictions on sales of securities, etc. See id.
212 See Wall et al., supra note 209, at 9.
213 See Corporate Fast Facts, PAYPAL, http://206.200.251.32/documentdisplay.cfm?Docu-
mentID=2260 (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
214 See id.  Paypal is owned by eBay and contributes thirty-nine percent of eBay’s annual
revenue. Id.
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vices without a middleman.215  UPS, for example, offers its clients a
variety of services, including shipping and packaging of merchandise,
as well as financing services.216  In 1998, UPS started UPS Capital to
provide asset-based lending and factoring to some of its commercial
clients.217  Today it offers a wide range of supply chain financing op-
tions, small-business lending, cargo insurance, and other financial
services.218
Other institutions are also offering services that initially belonged
to banks.219  Volkswagen entered the banking market with Volk-
swagen Bank USA and offers services and products such as savings
accounts, home-equity lines of credit, auto financing, credit cards, and
checking accounts.220  The Money Centers at Wal-Mart, which are spe-
cifically targeted at Wal-Mart customers who do not have bank ac-
counts, offer a variety of services including check cashing,
international money transfers, and money orders.221  Retailers, such as
7-Eleven222 and Nordstrom, and even universities, such as Drexel Uni-
versity, offer various banking services.223  Similarly, IBM Global Fi-
nancing, Hewlett-Packard Financial Services, and Dell Financial
Services each offer financing for businesses looking to upgrade their
technology.224  Caterpillar Financial offers direct financing and insur-
ance products for its equipment purchasers.225
The prevalence of these banking and commerce alliances speaks
both to the need for them in the marketplace as well as their commer-
cial success.  Many commercial firms engage in financing to increase
profits and efficiency.  Most of these commercially operated “banks”
215 See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 441–74 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining the changing landscape of worldwide
business and the need to adapt to stay competitive).
216 Helen Stock, UPS Hopes Loans Deliver Customers, AM. BANKER, Nov. 17, 2000, at 1.
217 Id.; see Baradaran, supra note 69, at 1193.
218 See David Breitkopf, UPS, With Newly Added Bank, Makes Top 10 in SBA Loans, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 15, 2001, at 1; Products & Services, UPS CAPITAL N. AM., http://capital.ups.com/
solutions/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
219 Pekarek & Huth, supra note 94, at 633.
220 Id.
221 Wendy Zellner, Your New Banker?, BUSINESSWEEK, Feb. 7, 2005, at 28.
222 Id.
223 Pekarek & Huth, supra note 94, at 635.
224 DELL FIN. SERVICES, http://dfs.us.dell.com/Pages/DFShomepage.aspx (last visited Nov.
19, 2011); IBM GLOBAL FINANCING, http://www.ibm.com/financing/us/index.html (last visited
Nov. 19, 2011); Leasing & Financing, HP, http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-financial-services/solu-
tions/leasing.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
225 Financing & Insurance, CAT FIN., http://finance.cat.com/cda/layout?m=943078x=7 (last
visited Nov. 19, 2011).
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function outside of the BHC structure and demonstrate that the sepa-
ration of banking and commerce in commerce runs counter to the de-
mands of the modern market.  The trend in modern business is toward
diversity of products and increased inclusion of financial services.  The
forced separation of commercial firms from banks does not seem sus-
tainable in the increasingly integrated marketplace.
A. Industrial Banks
The industrial bank has survived for thirty years outside the scope
of the BHCA.  This form of financial institution came under intense
scrutiny due to Wal-Mart’s infamous application and was the subject
of a House and Senate bill aimed at its termination.226  Although the
controversy subsided after Wal-Mart withdrew its application, the
charter is still seen as dangerous in some sectors, and the calls for its
elimination have not abated.227  Even Dodd-Frank addresses indus-
trial banks by imposing a moratorium on new charters and commis-
sioning a U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) report on
the safety of the charter.228  Congress passed on the opportunity to
ban the charter in 2007, but it may confront the issue of industrial
banks again in the near future.  Ironically, hidden in an afterthought
to financial reform is a valuable example of a successful alliance of
banking and commerce that demonstrates the stability of commer-
cially owned banks in contrast to traditional BHCs.
Companies with industrial banks include GE, BMW, Toyota,
Pitney Bowes, Harley-Davidson, and Target.229  Industrial banks have
been eligible for FDIC insurance since 1982 by virtue of provisions
that distinguish them from traditional retail banks.230  Many of the ma-
jor auto manufacturers use industrial banks to offer financing options
226 See Dash, supra note 2; see also Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007, H.R.
698, 110th Cong. (2007).
227 See Silla Brush, Manufacturing Giants Aim to Protect Industrial Banks, HILL (Apr. 12,
2010, 7:00 PM ET), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/91793-manufacturing-giants-aim-to-
protect-industrial-banks (discussing various interests’ positions regarding the ongoing industrial
bank debate).
228 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 603, 124 Stat. 1376, 1597–99 (2010) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. 1815 note).
229 Financial Reports of Industrial Loan Companies, IBANKNET, http://www.ibanknet.com/
scripts/callreports/fiList.aspx?type=ilc (last visited Nov. 19, 2011); see also Baradaran, supra note
69, at 1189.
230 Pursuant to CEBA, an industrial bank is not a “bank” for purposes of the BHCA if it
meets one of the following conditions: (1) the institution does not accept demand deposits,
(2) the institution’s total assets are less than $100 million, or (3) a company has not acquired
control of the institution after August 10, 1987.  12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H)(i) (2006); see also
Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 71, at 41.
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to purchasers and dealers of their automobiles.231  Commercial giant
GE offers a wide variety of financial services through GE Capital in-
cluding commercial lending and leasing, consumer financing, and real
estate financing.232  GE Money Bank also issues many private label
retail credit cards, including for stores such as J.C. Penney and Wal-
Mart.233  Owning an industrial bank gives a commercial firm access to
FDIC-insured deposits while enabling it to offer a wide array of finan-
cial products to its customers.
The experience in the industrial bank sector has been instructive.
Industrial banks are one of the only types of banks that can be owned
and operated by commercial firms.234  They are primarily found in the
state of Utah and have been operating successfully for several de-
cades.235  To date, no commercially owned industrial bank failure in
Utah has caused any amount of loss to the FDIC insurance fund.236
According to various industry measures, Utah industrial banks are
among the healthiest banks in the country.237  The Appendix includes
an analysis of banking figures as of September 30, 2010, for state-
chartered banks across the United States.  The data illustrate that in-
dustrial banks have higher capital-to-asset ratios, better quality assets,
and more efficient earnings on average than other banks.238  Commer-
cially owned industrial banks have a healthier risk profile than their
noncommercially owned counterparts according to bank health mea-
sures commonly used by the FDIC.239  Although several of the Utah
industrial banks lost money in 2008 and 2009, they remain well capi-
talized overall and have good asset quality.240
Utah regulators and industrial bank supporters attribute this suc-
cess to the vigilant regulatory structure that surrounds the firms as
231 See Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 71, at 42–43.
232 See GE CAPITAL, http://www.gecapital.com/en/index.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
233 See J. C. Penney Corporation, Inc. Privacy Policy, JCPENNEY, http://www.jcpenney.com/
jcp/CustomerServiceSub.aspx?CatTyp=CSR&CatID=12490 (last updated Apr. 5, 2011); Walmart
Money Center: Walmart Credit Cards, WALMART, http://www.walmart.com/cp/Credit-Card-Ben-
efits/435440 (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
234 For a thorough analysis of Industrial Banks, see Baradaran, supra note 69, at 1144–51.
235 Id. at 1145–46.
236 H.R. 698, the Industrial Bank Holding Company Act of 2007: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 157 (Apr. 25, 2007) [hereinafter H.R. 698 Hearing] (testi-
mony of G. Edward Leary, Utah Comm’r of Financial Institutions).
237 See infra Appendix.
238 See infra Appendix (comparing the capital ratios of Utah commercially owned indus-
trial banks to traditional commercial banks as of the third quarter of 2010).  FDIC and Utah
state-regulator statistics are on file with author.  A chart is provided in the Appendix.
239 See infra Appendix.
240 See infra Appendix; Lipton, supra note 127.
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well as the support these banks receive from well-funded parent com-
panies.  Utah regulators report that in several instances, an industrial
bank in trouble has quickly received a much-needed capital infusion
from its parent.241  Even when a parent such as GM is suffering from
its own capital weaknesses, it has been able to offer assistance to its
subsidiary, GMAC.242  This relationship is possible because of the di-
versity of assets and operations between the parent and the banking
subsidiary.
This easy access to capital cannot be understated, as it is the most
important factor for bank safety.  An industrial bank also benefits
from its business relationship with the parent.  There are few market-
ing costs associated with industrial banks because their business is
often handed to them by their parent companies.  Most parents organ-
ize industrial banks to add value to an existing business; as a result,
they begin as a profitable enterprise with few startup costs and pit-
falls.243  Most traditional banks only achieve this level of security and
efficacy after many years in operation.244
B. Arguments Against Mixing Banking and Commerce
The arguments against mixing banking with commerce at the
bank-ownership level fall into three categories: (1) keeping banking
and commerce separate has been the policy for a long time in this
country, has gained strength over time, and should continue; (2) bank-
ing regulators do not have the authority to effectively supervise parent
companies; and (3) mixing banking and commerce produces systemic
risk, which endangers the safety and soundness of the banking system.
First is the argument that the policy of keeping banking and com-
merce separate has been generally followed since 1787 and has gained
strength over time through legislation.245  However, as already noted,
scholars who have described the history of separation have often con-
flated the separation of banking and commerce in banking and the
separation of banking and commerce in commerce when advocating
continued separation.246  Those that argue that the separation of bank-
ing and commerce is part of the American tradition do not accurately
241 Telephone Interview with George Sutton, Partner, Jones Waldo Law Firm (Jan. 7, 2009).
242 Telephone Interview with Darryle Rude, Supervisor of Indus. Banks for the State of
Utah (Jan. 28, 2009).
243 ILC’s—a Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues, supra note 207, at 207
(testimony of George Sutton, Esq., on behalf of the Securities Industry Association).
244 Id.
245 See Symons, supra note 21, at 685–89; Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 14, at 1554.
246 See supra text accompanying note 13.
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depict the realities of early banks or historical ties between banking
and commerce.247  Many of the early bank charters were controlled by
industrialists who used their banks to support their commercial
activities.248
Second is the argument that banking regulators lack the authority
to exercise adequate supervision over commercial parents of subsidi-
ary banks.249  Some argue that without federal consolidated supervi-
sion250 of bank parent companies, the financial system is less stable251
and the parent company is more prone to risk.252  Federal consolidated
supervision is meant to catch weaknesses in a BHC before they pose a
threat.253  In contrast to federal consolidated supervision, the FDIC is
limited in the scope of its supervision and the extent to which it can
247 H.R. 698 Hearing, supra note 236, at 122 (statement of Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (“If left unchecked, this recent and poten-
tial future growth of firms operating under the [industrial bank] exception threatens to under-
mine the decisions that Congress has made concerning the separation of banking and commerce
in the American economy . . . .”).
248 The Bank of the Manhattan Company was formed by the Manhattan Company, which
was created to provide New York City with safe water. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH & STRATEGIC
PLANNING, supra note 32, at 24.  The bank became the largest in the city as well as in the state,
and survives today as Chase Manhattan Bank. See id.  Additionally,
[i]n the nineteenth century, for example, Moses Taylor owned controlling interests
in the National City Bank (a forerunner of Citibank) . . . [and] owned controlling
interests in a mercantile house, a gas utility and an iron company.  Thomas Mellon
started a private bank in Pittsburgh in the mid-nineteenth century and by the turn
of the century the Mellon family owned controlling interests in Mellon National
Bank, Gulf Oil, Alcoa Aluminum, and various other industrial enterprises.
Haubrich & Santos, supra note 17, at 155.  For additional examples of investors that have had
controlling interests in both banks and commercial firms simultaneously, see Thomas F. Huertas,
Can Banking and Commerce Mix?, 7 CATO J. 743, 744 (1988).
249 See H.R. 698 Hearing, supra note 236, at 131 (statement of Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chair-
man, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System); Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 14,
at 1613–17.
250 Federal consolidated supervision is “a comprehensive approach to banking supervision
which endeavors to evaluate the strength of an entire group, taking into account all the risks
which may affect a bank (or individual regulated firms within the group), regardless of whether
these risks are carried in the books of the bank or related entities.” WORK GROUP NO. 3, ASS’N
OF SUPERVISORS OF BANKS OF THE AMS., CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION 15 (2008), available at
http://www.asbaweb.org/Grupos/libros/fscommand/doc7.pdf.
251 See Industrial Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217, 5217–18,
5221–23 (proposed Feb. 5, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 354) (justifying proposed regula-
tions in part on this ground); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-621, INDUSTRIAL
LOAN CORPORATIONS: RECENT ASSET GROWTH AND COMMERCIAL INTEREST HIGHLIGHT DIF-
FERENCES IN REGULATORY AUTHORITY 27–28, 33–34, 79–80 (2005) (noting these concerns),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05621.pdf.
252 See H.R. 698 Hearing, supra note 236, at 122, 133–34 (statement of Donald L. Kohn,
Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).
253 Id. at 131–32.
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examine a commercial parent of a bank.254  The regulator cannot im-
pose capital requirements on parent companies and has limited au-
thority to bring administrative proceedings against parent companies
and affiliates.255  Some also argue that the FDIC does not have the
expertise to identify or control risk in a commercial firm.256
However, as demonstrated by the recent crisis, there is no mo-
nopoly of regulatory expertise when it comes to bank regulation.
Most of the banking regulators have been criticized for not detecting
and addressing the failures in the financial system.257  The problems
with regulation discussed above affect the regulators equally.  Dodd-
Frank was a recognition by Congress that many of the regulatory
agencies were doing duplicative work (which resulted in inefficien-
cies) and that collectively, they missed the warning signs that they
were tasked to address.258
Many of the commercial firms that would own banks are regu-
lated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and their
subsidiary banks are regulated by the FDIC.259  These two regulators
have the opportunity to detect risk in these companies and communi-
cate the risk to each other.  In addition, the FDIC has broad powers to
issue cease and desist orders to parent companies of industrial banks
that the FDIC views as endangering the companies’ subsidiaries.260  If
commercial firms are allowed to own banks, the FDIC would need to
retain the power to oversee a commercial parent’s activities that may
254 “The FDIC may examine an ‘affiliate’ . . . only to the extent ‘necessary to disclose fully
(i) the relationship between [the ILC] and any such affiliate; and (ii) the effect of such relation-
ship on the [ILC].’” Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 14, at 1613 (alterations in original) (quoting
12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(4)(A) (2006)).
255 Id. at 1614.
256 Id. at 1617.  It has likewise been argued that this authority should not be granted be-
cause it would greatly expand the government’s supervisory role in the general economy, and
this would increase the likelihood that firms would grow large enough to be “too big to disci-
pline” and end up capturing the agency regulating them. Id. at 1617–21.
257 See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Failing Upward at the Fed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at B1
(“But it was not all [the banks’] fault.  These were regulated institutions, and the regulators
failed.”).  For a general discussion of how banking regulation played a direct role in fomenting
the recent crisis, see Calomiris, supra note 196, at 65–74.
258 See Daniel Hemel, Note, Regulatory Consolidation and Cross-Border Coordination:
Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 213, 214–15 & n.2 (2011) (“[T]he
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which President Obama signed
in July 2010, folded the [Office of Thrift Supervision] into the [Office of the Comptroller of
Currency] and further centralized supervisory responsibilities in a new Financial Stability Over-
sight Council chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury.” (footnotes omitted)).
259 See 12 U.S.C. § 1814(a)(1) (subjecting banks to FDIC regulation); 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2006)
(imposing registration requirements on issuers of exchange-traded securities).
260 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b).
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cause harm to a banking subsidiary.  At least in the industrial bank
sector, the FDIC and state regulators have had great success in regu-
lating commercial parents of banks.261
The final argument against mixing banking and commerce is the
most important one because it encompasses the other arguments and
because the safety and soundness of the banking sector is the first
priority in regulation.262  But if allowing commercial firms to own
banks would compromise safety and soundness, then such ownership
should be discouraged.  There are several facets to this argument that
are dealt with below.  First, some argue that allowing commercial
firms to own banks would expose banks to risks inherent in commerce
while extending the federal safety net to the commercial sector.263  In
other words, a banking subsidiary would be vulnerable to all of the
business risks associated with its commercial owner.  For example, if a
bank were owned by a firm that is less financially stable than Wal-
Mart, the company’s business risk would spread to its bank, threaten-
ing its safety and soundness.  This situation, while part of a typical
cyclical market, would be especially troubling with a bank because the
bank is supported by the FDIC fund and the fund would serve as a
subsidy to a risky commercial venture.  In addition, the bank’s assets
might also be used fraudulently to support a failing parent.
This scenario is indeed troubling, but it is not purely hypothetical.
Several commercial parents of industrial loan companies (“ILCs”)
have failed in the past without causing any harm to the FDIC fund.264
261 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Issues Cease and Desist Order
Against Fremont Investment & Loan, Brea, California, and its Parents (Mar. 7, 2007), available
at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2007/pr07022.html (providing an example where the
FDIC issued a cease and desist order against Fremont Investment and Loan, Brea, California,
and its parents).
262 See Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System,
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 673 (2010) (stating that the central focus of banking regulation
is to reduce systemic risk).
263 See Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 14, at 1589–93, 1606–13.  This argument assumes
that commercial firms and commercial activities are inherently more risky than banking, but this
argument has been challenged by scholars and recent history. See, e.g., HALDANE & ALESSAN-
DRI, supra note 5, at 5 (arguing that banks have an incentive to take risks and be overleveraged
because of the banking of the state).  Others also argue that commercially owned banks and
industrial banks are subject to additional risks when owned by a commercial company because
the risk of a troubled commercial parent is often attributed to the bank itself. See Wilmarth,
Wal-Mart, supra note 14, at 1606–07.  If the parent company defaults on its bonds or shows other
signs of distress, it can spark a bank run. Id.
264 The following commercial parents have declared bankruptcy without causing a failure
to their subsidiary banks: Tyco, Conesco, Lehman Brothers, and Flying J. See Baradaran, supra
note 69, at 1181.
2012] THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE 431
In the ILC experience, a commercial parent’s failure has not been a
fatal blow to its bank.  Even after Lehman Brothers’ swift and com-
plete failure—the largest U.S. bankruptcy filing in history—its subsid-
iary banks have survived, though not without struggle, and are
currently being prepared for sale.265
However, there is a cautionary tale of hubris in GM’s ILC,
GMAC.  Founded in 1919, General Motors Acceptance Corporation
served as General Motors’ financing arm until GM sold a majority
interest in 2006.266  GMAC was profitable for the first 85 years of its
existence, peaking at $2.9 billion in net income in 2004.267  In 2004,
GMAC purchased a Utah ILC, which became GMAC Automotive
Bank, to go along with GMAC Commercial Mortgage Bank—another
Utah ILC.268  As of 2007, GMAC Automotive Bank held nearly $20
billion in assets, making it the fifth largest ILC by asset size in the
country.269  GMAC initially relied on its ILC to underwrite auto leases
and loans, but quickly became dominated by mortgage lending, which
accounted for the vast majority of the ILC’s loans; as of 2007, $13
billion of the ILC’s $16 billion in total loans were in residential mort-
gages.270  Other auto manufacturers have owned or currently own
ILCs,271 but none were involved in subprime mortgage lending to the
265 Aurora Bank FSB, formerly known as Lehman Brothers Bank, and Woodlands Com-
mercial Bank—a Utah industrial bank—were not part of the bankruptcy filing.  Regulators have
restricted both banks’ ability to offer new certificates of deposit due to struggles to meet capital
requirements, but Lehman hopes to sell the banks—valued at a combined $1.42 billion—to pay
off creditors. Lehman Preps Bank Units for Sale or Shutdown, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2010, 9:37
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/02/us-lehmanbrothers-idUSTRE68118V20100902.
266 Bill Bowman, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), GM HERITAGE
CENTER, http://history.gmheritagecenter.com/wiki/index.php/General_Motors_Acceptance_Cor-
poration_(GMAC) (last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
267 See Lee Hawkins, Jr., GMAC Hopes to Shed ‘Junk’ Baggage: Pending Cerberus Deal
Could Boost Credit Rating, Helping Current Parent GM, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2006, at C3.
268 Johnson & Kaufman, supra note 71, at 42; Kenneth Spong & Eric Robbins, Industrial
Loan Companies: A Growing Industry Sparks a Public Policy Debate, FED. RES. BANK KAN.
CITY ECON. REV., Fourth Quarter 2007, at 41, 52.
269 Spong & Robbins, supra note 268, at 47, 51.
270 Id. at 52.
271 For example, Volkswagen Bank USA, BMW Bank, and Eaglemark Savings Bank,
which is owned and operated by Harley-Davidson, all serve functions for their parent companies
similar to the function GMAC Bank serves for GM. Id. at 51.  This reflects the belief within the
auto industry that access to credit is necessary to survive economic downturns and to maintain
market share in the United States. See Sharon Terlep, GM Again Sees Need for GMAC, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 11, 2011, at B1.  Reliance on outside sources of credit for consumer lending and
dealer financing could further expose a manufacturer to economic downturns. Id.
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extent that GMAC was.272  Naturally, GMAC Automotive Bank suf-
fered when the subprime market collapsed.
Until the subprime market collapsed, GMAC had been consist-
ently profitable for GM—accounting for eighty percent of GM’s prof-
its in 2004.273  However, GM encountered financial difficulties as the
economy declined.  In 2005, GM reported losses in excess of $10 bil-
lion, resulting in the downgrading of GM’s credit ratings to junk-bond
status.274  Amidst significant concerns that GM’s rating would impact
GMAC’s rating, and in an effort to distance GMAC from GM and to
finance GM’s restructuring, GM sold a majority interest in GMAC,
along with its ILC, to an investment group led by Cerberus Capital
Investments.275  GMAC still remained the primary financing arm for
GM even after the sale.  In 2008, however, GMAC “dramatically re-
strict[ed] leasing amid the U.S. financial crisis,” causing GM to spiral
toward bankruptcy.276  Only intervention from the federal government
in the form of a multibillion-dollar bailout saved both GM and
GMAC (now Ally Financial) from failure.277
One of the greatest problems with GMAC was that the mortgage-
financing operation grew to be too dominant a part of the business.  A
potentially problematic scenario in the commercially owned banking
structure would be if the bank grew to a size that rivaled the parent or
even dwarfed the parent.  In other words, a small commercial firm
should not be the parent of a large bank because the commercial par-
ent could not be a source of strength if the bank were to run into
problems.  In fact, a small, weak parent would be similar to the tradi-
tional BHC structure with parent companies that are a shell without
any independent revenue.278  However, it would be more troubling
with a commercial parent because if the FDIC fund were used to res-
cue a bank, the taxpayer funds could possibly make their way into the
parent’s coffers.279  In this situation, the tail would be wagging the dog
and the bank would not have a stable parent that could support it.
272 Conor Dougherty, et al., Subprime Pullback May Crimp Consumer Spending, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 2, 2007, at A2.
273 Lauren Etter, Is General Motors Unraveling?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2006, at A7.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Terlep, supra note 271.
277 Ally received $17.2 billion, id., while GM received $50 billion, Sharon Terlep, GM Chief
to Pay for Chartered Flight to D.C., WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
10001424052748704448304575197002653739926.html.
278 Baradaran, supra note 69, at 1189.
279 Id.
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It is also possible that a commercial firm could be a source of
weakness.  A commercial parent might not be able to come to the aid
of a troubled subsidiary, or the commercial parent’s weakness might
even push the subsidiary bank to collapse.  This possibility would also
need to be addressed by targeted regulation.  There are several barri-
ers already included in the BHCA—such as sections 23A and 23B—
that are designed to prevent transactions between affiliates.280  A re-
cent study shows, however, that these barriers have not been effec-
tively enforced in the past.281  Regulators would need to be vigilant in
addressing such breaches and detecting others.  However, there is no
indication that these sections would more easily be breached with a
commercial parent than with the existing structure of banks and their
affiliates.
In addition, there is a risk that commercial parents or their sub-
sidiaries would become TBTF, in which case the government would
be forced to step in to save them.282  This assurance would effectively
subsidize large commercial firms283 and extend the safety net to enti-
ties that are unsupervised by banking authorities.284  This unfair ad-
vantage could encourage conglomeration, thereby concentrating
280 Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act limit transactions between Federal
Reserve–member banks and their affiliates.  12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1 (2006); see also Transac-
tions Between Member Banks and Their Affiliates (Regulation W), 12 C.F.R. § 223.1 (2010)
(implementing the statutory limitations).
281 Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise
of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683 (2011).
282 A scenario often presented considers if Enron had an industrial bank. See, e.g., Emil
Lee, First Bank of Wal-Mart?, MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 20, 2006), http://www.fool.com/investing/
value/2006/11/20/first-bank-of-walmart.aspx; see also Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 14, at
1592–93. See generally Consideration of Regulatory Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 335–58 (2004) (testimony of Ed
Mierzwinski, Dir. of Consumer Protection, United States Public Interest Research Group &
Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, National Consumer Law Center).
283 Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 14, at 1590–91.
284 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-155, at 10 (2007); ILC’s—a Review of Charter, Ownership, and
Supervision Issues, supra note 207, at 150 (statement of Douglas H. Jones, Acting General Coun-
sel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).  It is further argued that this would lead to unfair
competition as large firms could use this consequent funding advantage through generous divi-
dends, preferential loans (to affiliates and suppliers), or by transferring riskier assets to the sub-
sidiary bank’s balance sheet.  Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 14, at 1594–95; see also H.R. 698
Hearing, supra note 236, at 128 (statement of Donald L. Kohn, Vice Chairman, Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System).
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economic power,285 and increase the risk of monopolies,286 predatory
pricing,287 and other anticompetitive activities.288
There are also potential problems with fraudulent conveyances
between the parent and the subsidiary.  Sections 23A and 23B prevent
affiliate transactions within banks and are designed to prevent any af-
filiate transactions between a parent and its subsidiary.  However, as
already mentioned, during the recent financial crisis, regulators in
whose discretion it fell to enforce compliance with these limits often
failed to do so.289  Thus, these relaxed standards during times of crisis
would endanger safety and soundness if a commercial parent were
tacitly permitted to reach into the bank’s coffers or vice versa.
Because banking and commerce have been separated for many
years while the banking system has undergone a dramatic change,
there is little empirical data that can demonstrate the effects of such
alliances on the banking system as a whole.  The best indicators of the
potential success of commercial-banking alliances are industrial
banks, which have remained robust and sound despite widespread
banking collapse.  Industrial banks have succeeded not in spite of but
because of their well-funded commercial parents.290
In the absence of data that justify the separation of banking and
commerce in commerce, both the success of industrial banks as well as
285 Cantwell F. Muckenfuss III & Robert C. Eager, The Separation of Banking and Com-
merce Revisited, in THE MIXING OF BANKING AND COMMERCE: THE 43RD ANNUAL CONFER-
ENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 39, 51–52 (2007) (citing ILC’s—a Review of
Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues, supra note 207, at 132 (statement of Richard J. Hill-
man, Managing Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, General Accountabil-
ity Office)); see also H.R. 698 Hearing, supra note 236, at 128 (statement of Donald L. Kohn,
Vice Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (“Congress expressed con-
cern that allowing banks and commercial firms to affiliate with each other could lead to the
concentration of economic power in a few very large conglomerates.”).
286 See Terry J. Jorde, President and CEO, CountryBank USA, Address at the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Symposium: The Future of Banking: The Structure and Role of
Commercial Affiliations (July 16, 2003), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/
future_jordespeech.html.
287 H.R. 698 Hearing, supra note 236, at 104–05 (statement of James P. Ghiglieri, Jr., Presi-
dent, Alpha Community Bank; Chairman, Independent Community Bankers of America).
288 Jorde, supra note 286.
289 Omarova, supra note 281.
290 Baradaran, supra note 69, at 1195.  In addition, a recent study analyzed commercial and
banking interactions at the entity level—in other words, not with respect to banks engaging in
commercial activity, but with respect to banks interacting with commercial firms.  Feibelman,
supra note 26, at 974.  The study found that there are benefits when banks are involved with
their corporate debtors in the commercial lending context. Id.  The author concludes that these
positive interactions with banks and corporations suggest that the rationale for the separation of
banking and commerce may not apply to all contexts. Id.
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the inherent risks in the current banking model described above
demonstrate that there is potential for commercially owned banks to
provide safety in banking.  Commercial ownership of banks might be
one way to counteract incentives toward risktaking by forcing some
parent companies to internalize their risks.
1. Should the Exception Become the Rule?
Is it misleading to use the success of an exception, the industrial
bank, to question the structure of traditional banks?  Just because a
Wal-Mart bank would prove sound, should we allow the full range of
commercial firms to operate banks?  Or are banks such as GE Capital
misleading examples because their parents are so large and well
funded?  Perhaps if the ILC model is exported broadly, it would fail
and prove that the exception only works in small numbers that are
vigilantly guarded by regulators.  As discussed, there are several risks
and pitfalls in commercial ownership of banks, and regulators would
have to appropriately monitor these potential hazards.
What about the criticisms of bank regulation discussed above?  It
seems disingenuous to state on the one hand that regulators are not
capable of regulating bank safety, as this Article has repeatedly done,
and suggest on the other hand that if commercial firms were allowed
to own banks, that these very regulators would need to be entrusted
with keeping the system intact.  Regulators have greater difficulty en-
forcing rules that run against strong natural incentives and are better
able to monitor businesses that themselves have a natural incentive
toward decreased risktaking.  For example, regulators have great diffi-
culty enforcing vague standards of riskiness, but do not have difficulty
when it comes to enforcing black-and-white rules such as capital ade-
quacy requirements or product limits.  Regulators can adequately
monitor businesses to guard against fraud and self dealing or enforce
bright line rules.291
For commercially owned banks, regulation would have to address
the size of the bank vis-a`-vis the commercial parent to ensure that the
commercial parent is larger and better funded than a bank, and that a
bank is being used to service the commercial firm as opposed to the
291 See Raghuram Rajan, Rajan Roundtable: A Response from the Author, ECONOMIST
(Apr. 15, 2009, 1:00 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2009/04/rajan_round-
table_a_response_fr (arguing that “regulators rarely have the political or intellectual indepen-
dence to exercise discretion” and that they are best served when they have defined rules to
follow). See generally Shahien Nasiripour, Geithner Stresses Need for ‘Clear Rules’ for Wall
Street, But Senate Bill Doesn’t Have Them, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 21, 2010, http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2010/04/21/geithner-stresses-need-fo_n_545281.html.
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other way around.  Regulators would need to ensure that the bank did
not become so large as to be the dominant entity in the corporation.
Most commercial firms that currently own banks use them as a means
to support their business and not vice versa.292
2. Can Regulators Monitor Nonbanking Businesses?
Another concern is whether banking regulators can adequately
monitor risks associated with a commercial firm.  This argument as-
serts that although the FDIC and other banking regulators may have
developed expertise in identifying risky behavior in banks, they are
not trained in assessing risks in commercial entities.293  This argument
assumes, however, that the same regulator would need to monitor
both businesses, or that it is necessary for a regulator of a banking
subsidiary to also regulate a parent company.  In reality, there are
many organizational structures in which different regulators oversee
different branches of a business.294  A banking regulator can regulate a
subsidiary bank and assure that the bank’s operations do not violate
imposed limits, while a commercial regulator can oversee a parent
firm.
Regulators of ILCs operate in this manner and have successfully
provided adequate oversight to the banks while communicating with
the parent company’s regulator when the need has arisen.295  It is also
a misconception that the same people who manage the company man-
age its bank.296  In the industrial bank sector, the banks are often run
by experienced bank managers with little control exerted over day-to-
day operations by commercial management.
292 See supra Part III.A.
293 Wilmarth, Wal-Mart, supra note 14, at 1613, 1617–18.
294 Banks themselves provide a good example of this, with the FDIC, among other state
and federal agencies, regulating traditional “banking” activities and the SEC regulating banks’
investment activities. Cf. Tamar Frankel, The Dual State-Federal Regulation of Financial Institu-
tions—a Policy Proposal, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 53, 54–55 (1987) (identifying the various federal
agencies that regulate banks).
295 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(4) (2006) empowers the FDIC to examine any affiliate of an indus-
trial bank to determine the relationship between the industrial bank and its parent, and the
effect of such relationship on the industrial bank.  Utah, California, and Nevada also have direct
authority to conduct examinations of parents and affiliates. See The FDIC’s Supervision of In-
dustrial Loan Companies: A Historical Perspective, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.
gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum04/industrial_loans.html (last updated
June 25, 2004).
296 Utah, for example, gives “considerable weight” in reviewing an industrial bank charter
application to whether managers of industrial banks have extensive bank management experi-
ence, and requires that a majority of the industrial bank’s board of directors be made up of
independent members. See What is an Industrial Bank?, UTAH.GOV, http://www.dfi.utah.gov/
whatisIB.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
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3. Excessive Power?
One of the initially stated reasons for the separation of banking
and commerce was the fear of excessive power in Transamerica.
Given Wal-Mart’s controversial practices in the past,297 it is reasonable
to be wary of a Wal-Mart national bank and fearful that it could drive
many smaller banks out of business.  If the ILC exception were main-
tained or expanded, it is possible that large commercial firms would
be given a competitive advantage over small banks and dominate
banking.  This conglomeration of banking is a significant threat that
regulations have been fighting since the earliest days of banking.  It
has always been believed that a healthy banking system needs to be a
competitive market.
As discussed above, however, banking is more conglomerated
now than ever.  Most national banking chains are much larger than
ever before and continue to grow.298  Perhaps commercial firms enter-
ing into banking could curb this rapid expansion of the largest banks
and dilute their power.  However, there would be a risk that these
commercially owned banks would continue to grow and steadily take
over the market.  Based on experience with ILCs, most firms that
have owned banks are not interested in national branch banking.
They have gained the most profit and advantage from their banks by
servicing their in-house credit needs and branching locally.  Many
large companies have owned banks for generations without any dam-
age to competing small banks.299
The BHCA was passed due to fears of excess power, and those
who advocate for the separation of banking and commerce in com-
merce continue to express these fears.  However, modern trends in
banking do not support this apprehension.  To the contrary, it is to-
day’s large BHCs that are continually expanding and gaining market
share.  And what makes these conglomerates more dangerous than
commercially owned banks is that they are supported by the federal
government, which causes moral hazards, and in the event of failure,
can inflict serious systemic damage.
297 Tom Bliley, GLB Was Not an Invitation to Wal-Mart, AM. BANKER, Jan. 27, 2006, at 17
(discussing Wal-Mart’s history of driving local retailers out of business, and the “disastrous”
consequences that would follow if that were to happen in banking).
298 Supra Part I.A.
299 Target, GE, and many automakers already own industrial bank banks. See Financial
Reports of Industrial Loan Companies, supra note 229.
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CONCLUSION
The banking structure of the United States has two inherent
problems that have evaded, and will continue to evade, adequate reg-
ulation: First, banks have an incentive to engage in risktaking behav-
ior due to explicit and implicit government support.  Second,
regulators cannot keep up with innovation in banking that is driven by
the financial pressures on banks to be overleveraged.
Because it is unlikely that structural complexity in the banking
system can be simplified enough to provide adequate monitoring, the
most obvious way to avoid future problems is to change the risk struc-
ture at play in the banking system.  One possible approach is through
a measured challenge to the separation of banking and commerce—
specifically, through commercial ownership of traditional banks.
Policymakers and academics have ignored the implications of the
separation of banking and commerce for decades and have accepted
this separation as an obvious guiding principle in banking regulation.
This Article has attempted to clarify the debate surrounding the sepa-
ration of banking and commerce by defining two forms of separation
that have not previously been distinguished despite their important
structural differences.  This Article also makes a case for a wholesale
reconsideration of the separation of banking and commerce in
commerce.
The separation of banking and commerce in commerce has not
had the effect it was intended to have and has in fact led to a more
risk-prone banking system.  The historical and recent advocates of
separating banking and commerce in commerce have argued that al-
lowing the two sectors to mix would create a risky structure that is
prone to abuse and instability.  Ironically, the BHCA, which was en-
acted to enforce the separation of banking and commerce, has caused
a homogenous and conglomerated banking system that is increasingly
vulnerable to collapse.  Because banks can only be owned by or
merged with other banks, they have become too large and too
interconnected.
In light of these gradual changes and the systemic vulnerabilities
the recent crisis has revealed, it is interesting to revisit the much-con-
tested proposition of a Wal-Mart bank.  In comparison to the con-
glomerated banking system that is supported by the Federal Reserve’s
indulgence, a Wal-Mart bank no longer seems like the calamity it was
once thought to be.
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APPENDIX: BANK HEALTH INDICATORS
The various bank regulators all use the Uniform Financial Institu-
tions Rating System (also known as the CAMELS rating system) to
determine the health of the banks they oversee.  The six parts of the
CAMELS rating system are: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Man-
agement administration, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to mar-
ket risk.300  The CAMELS rating system is comprised of a mix of
objective and subjective standards, and the ratings themselves are
confidential and kept from the public.  However, a private party can
estimate a bank’s health through metrics that analyze the component
parts of the CAMELS rating system.  The most commonly used met-
rics include the capital-to-asset-ratio (to estimate capital adequacy),
the troubled asset ratio (asset quality), and the return on assets ratio
(earnings).  These metrics facilitate a comparison between three cross-
sections of the banking industry: all banks, Utah industrial banks,301
and Utah ILCs with a commercial parent.  On average, the data show
that Utah ILCs with commercial parents are healthier than other
banks.302
Capital-to-Asset Ratio.  The capital-to-asset ratio is one measure
of how well funded a bank is.303  Generally, a high capital-to-asset ra-
tio indicates that a large proportion of a bank’s risk is being borne by
its shareholders vis-a`-vis the bank’s creditors or the FDIC.304  This ra-
tio is an indication of a bank’s ability to absorb losses without putting
300 See, e.g., Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section1-1.html (last updated Feb. 8, 2005).
301 The Utah ILCs with assets as of September 30, 2010, are: ADB Bank, American Ex-
press Centurion Bank, BMW Bank of North America,* Capmark Bank, Celtic Bank Corpora-
tion, EnerBank USA,* First Electronic Bank,* GE Capital Financial Inc.,* LCA Bank
Corporation, Medallion Bank, Merrick Bank Corporation, Optumhealth Bank, Inc., Sallie Mae
Bank, Target Bank,* The Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc.,* Transportation Alliance Bank, Inc.,* UBS
Bank USA, Webbank, Woodlands Commercial Bank, World Financial Capital Bank, and Wright
Express Financial Services Corporation. Financial Reports of Industrial Loan Companies, supra
note 229.  The seven ILCs marked with an asterisk are owned by a commercial parent. See
UBPR, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www.ffiec.gov/ubpr.htm (last updated
Nov. 16, 2011) (follow “UBPR Reports” hyperlink; select “Uniform Bank Performance Report
(UBPR)” under “Report” heading; enter the applicable institution’s name under “Institution
Name” heading; then follow “Search” hyperlink).
302 These results are substantially similar to the data derived from FDIC quarterly call re-
ports as of June 30, 2010. NAT’L ASS’N OF INDUS. BANKERS, COMPARATIVE SAFETY AND
SOUNDNESS OF INDUSTRIAL BANKS (2010), available at http://www.industrialbankers.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2010/02/NAIBDataQ2-10.pdf.
303 The capital-to-asset ratio is calculated by dividing the total assets by the total bank
equity capital.
304 See, e.g., Lee Gilliam, Note, Accounting Consolidation Versus Capital Calculation: The
Conflict over Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Programs, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 291, 293 (2005).
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the bank at risk of failure.  Generally, the higher the capital-to-asset
ratio the more sound the bank is.  Figure 1 shows that the average
capital-to-asset ratio of both Utah ILCs and Utah ILCs with a com-
mercial parent is higher than the banking industry as a whole.305
Figure 1. Capital-to-Asset Ratio
Troubled Asset Ratio.  The troubled asset ratio compares noncur-
rent loans and other real estate owned (often repossessed) property as
a proportion of the bank’s total assets.306  High levels of troubled as-
sets indicate that stress is being put on the bank by its non- or under-
performing loan portfolio.  Figure 2 shows that troubled assets make
Figure 2. Troubled Asset Ratio
305 Figure 1 was produced by using data contained in UBPR, supra note 301.
306 The troubled asset ratio is calculated by dividing the sum of total capital and reserves
(the sum of total bank equity capital and loan loss reserves) by the total troubled assets (the sum
of nonaccrual loans and leases, noncurrent loans and leases, and other real estate owned).
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up a much smaller percentage of the assets of commercially owned
Utah ILCs compared to Utah ILCs as a whole, and an even smaller
percentage than all banks.307
Return on Assets Ratio.  The return on assets ratio is a measure of
the profitability of a company.308  A high ratio indicates that a bank is
efficient, and effectively turns its assets into income.  Figure 3 shows
that commercially owned Utah ILCs are more efficient at turning as-
sets into income than banks as a whole, and even other Utah ILCs.309
Figure 3. Return on Assets Ratio
307 Figure 2 was produced by using data contained in UBPR, supra note 301.
308 The return on assets ratio is calculated by dividing the average total assets for the last
three quarters by the net income.
309 Figure 3 was produced by using data contained in UBPR, supra note 301.
